Background
Google acquired the Android operating system in 2005 as mobile internet emerged. By 2018, approximately 80% of smart mobile devices in Europe and worldwide ran Android. Google offers proprietary apps and services (Play Store, Google Search, Chrome) that manufacturers (OEMs) and mobile network operators (MNOs) must license separately. The European Commission launched an investigation in 2015 following complaints about Google’s licensing practices.
The Commission issued a decision on 18 July 2018 finding that Google had abused its dominant position through four sets of contractual restrictions: (1) requiring pre-installation of Google Search to obtain the Play Store; (2) requiring pre-installation of Chrome to obtain Play Store and Google Search; (3) conditioning licensing on acceptance of anti-fragmentation obligations preventing Android forks; and (4) making revenue share payments conditional on excluding competing search services. The Commission imposed a fine of €4.34 billion and classified these restrictions as a single continuous infringement. Google and Alphabet appealed to the General Court, which partially annulled the fine but upheld most findings. Google and Alphabet further appealed to the Court of Justice.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Justice reviewed the General Court’s judgment on Google’s multiple grounds of appeal concerning the Commission’s findings. The opinion addresses whether Google’s tying practices and conditional licensing constituted abuse of dominant position by foreclosing competition in search services and other markets. The Court examined whether the General Court correctly applied the legal standard for tying abuse from prior case law (Microsoft v Commission), which requires establishing: (1) separate products; (2) dominance in the tying product; (3) lack of customer choice; (4) foreclosure of competition; and (5) absence of objective justification.
The judgment analyzes Google’s arguments that the Commission failed to demonstrate foreclosure effects and improperly ignored that OEMs retained freedom to pre-install competing services or set them as defaults. The Court examined how pre-installation and default settings function in practical terms—whether they create “status quo bias” that effectively forecloses competitors. The opinion also addresses whether Google’s conduct had legitimate objective justifications based on technical integration or consumer benefit.
Key Takeaways
- Pre-installation conditions on complementary products can constitute abusive tying even without formal prohibition on installing competitors, based on practical foreclosure effects
- The distinction between “pre-installation” and “default setting” lacks practical significance in contractual contexts involving multiple tying arrangements
- Foreclosure of competition can be established through examination of actual observed effects over significant time periods rather than prospective analysis of hypothetical scenarios
- Dominance in multiple complementary markets (Android app stores and search services) supports findings of abuse affecting each market through integrated product conditions
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies how EU competition law applies to technology platforms offering multiple complementary services. It establishes that pre-installation and conditional licensing can constitute abuse of dominance based on practical foreclosure effects, even when competitors technically retain the ability to be installed or set as defaults. The ruling affects how major technology companies structure their product ecosystems and licensing arrangements with device manufacturers. It reflects the EU’s approach to digital markets by focusing on market access barriers and foreclosure mechanisms rather than requiring direct evidence of consumer price increases.
The case also clarifies the appropriate legal standard for reviewing tying abuse in complex, multi-product technology contexts. The Court’s emphasis on examining practical effects and the cumulative impact of interconnected restrictions establishes important precedent for analyzing integrated product suites in digital markets, particularly where dominant positions span multiple complementary markets.