Background
Irama PTE Limited brought proceedings against Formark Scaffolding (Holdings) Limited in 2021 claiming rent arrears. At the Pre-Trial Review in January 2024, Irama failed to attend or obtain representation. Her Honour Judge Baucher struck out the claim and ordered Irama to pay Formark’s costs, subject to detailed assessment, with an interim payment of £30,000. Irama, acting through director Parvinder Chopra, missed the appeal deadline and obtained no extension of time from the High Court or Court of Appeal.
Formark served detailed assessment proceedings in April 2024. The Civil Procedure Rules required Irama to serve Points of Dispute (a detailed response to Formark’s bill of costs) within 21 days. Irama failed to do so. On 29 May 2024, Formark obtained a Default Costs Certificate in the sum of £187,553.11. When Irama applied to set this aside before Her Honour Judge Saunders, Irama still had not served Points of Dispute and did not attend the hearing. HHJ Saunders dismissed Irama’s application.
Irama then applied to set aside HHJ Saunders’ order before Her Honour Judge Bloom on 5 December 2025. Mr Chopra appeared in person (with the judge’s permission, though he had no legal qualifications). He raised allegations that Formark’s counsel, Mr Malone, appeared without proper right of audience under the Legal Services Act 2007. HHJ Bloom found the application had no merit—Points of Dispute remained unserved, now 18 months overdue—and marked the application “totally without merit.” She upheld the default costs certificate and awarded Formark an additional £17,000 and £4,500 in costs. Irama sought permission to appeal.
The Court’s Holding
Mr Justice Griffiths refused permission to appeal and confirmed HHJ Bloom’s decision. On the threshold issue of Mr Malone’s right of audience: At the time of the earlier hearing before HHJ Saunders, Mr Malone was employed by Formark’s solicitors as a costs draughtsman, a role entitling him to appear on costs matters. By HHJ Bloom’s hearing, he had been called to the Bar and possessed full rights of audience as a qualified barrister. The court held that even if Mr Malone had lacked formal authority at an earlier stage, he could have appeared with the judge’s permission—which courts routinely grant—and in any event, procedural irregularities in representation do not invalidate a court order if the substantive decision is sound. The Legal Services Act 2007 exempts anyone appearing with court permission from the prohibition on unauthorized practice.
On the merits: The appeal had no prospect of success. Irama’s central failure was the absence of Points of Dispute. This document is mandatory for challenging a default costs certificate; without it, there is no substantive dispute to litigate. Points of Dispute were due within 21 days of service in April 2024, yet remained unfiled as of 5 December 2025—eighteen months late. HHJ Bloom generously considered the application on its underlying merits despite this gross procedural default. She found no excuse: Mr Chopra had filed numerous applications and appeals demonstrating familiarity with the Civil Procedure Rules, and the necessity of serving Points of Dispute had been made “crystal clear” by HHJ Saunders. The costs awards—summarily assessed at £17,000 and £4,500—were reasonable and showed no sign of being punitive or disproportionate. Justice Griffiths reviewed all nine Grounds of Appeal and found none had merit; most were irrelevant to HHJ Bloom’s decision or sought to revisit earlier orders from which Irama was now time-barred from appealing.
The court also imposed a Limited Civil Restraint Order against both Irama as a company and Mr Chopra personally, restricting their ability to file further applications in these proceedings without first obtaining court permission. This reflected a troubling pattern: at least three prior applications certified as “totally without merit,” a track record of failed appeals, and the underlying claim itself abandoned before trial. The Court of Appeal (Whipple LJ) had previously warned of this step.
Key Takeaways
- Failure to serve Points of Dispute is fatal to any challenge of a default costs certificate, particularly when the omission persists for months or years. Courts will not entertain substantive challenges without them.
- A person appearing with explicit court permission—even if lacking independent authority under the Legal Services Act—is an “exempt person” and commits no breach; procedural irregularities in representation do not invalidate sound judicial decisions.
- Costs draughtsmen employed to appear on costs matters have inherent authority to do so; barristers with practising certificates possess rights of audience as of right.
- Civil restraint orders are imposed on litigants and their representatives who persistently file frivolous, wholly meritless applications, as a means of protecting court resources and the other party.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the importance of procedural compliance in detailed costs assessments. The default costs certificate regime requires strict adherence to filing deadlines; the mechanism exists precisely because litigants must engage substantively with bills of costs or lose the right to dispute them. An 18-month delay in serving Points of Dispute, without excuse or explanation, cannot be remedied merely by invoking the overriding objective or litigant-in-person status. The judgment clarifies that courts will not tolerate manipulation of the system through procedural objections (here, unfounded allegations about counsel’s authority) aimed at diverting attention from substantive defaults.
The decision also provides important guidance on representative authority. It settles that the Legal Services Act does not prohibit anyone from appearing with court permission, and that courts have unfettered discretion to allow representation by non-lawyers, directors, or others deemed suitable for the case at hand. This preserves access to justice for unrepresented parties while preventing bad-faith attempts to derail proceedings by challenging the other side’s representation. Finally, the civil restraint order signals that persistent, wholly meritless litigation—particularly when it reflects an abuse of process rather than genuine grievance—will be met with judicial sanctions that restrict future filings.