Background
Emory Austin Carter pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). The indictment alleged four prior Georgia convictions for cocaine distribution crimes committed on separate occasions in 2005, 2012, and 2016, all under Georgia Code § 16-13-30. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), these prior convictions, if they qualify as “serious drug offenses,” trigger a mandatory 15-year minimum sentence.
Carter objected to the ACCA enhancement at sentencing, arguing that Georgia’s statutory definition of cocaine was categorically broader than the federal definition. Georgia’s statute covers “any . . . stereoisomers of cocaine,” while federal law covers only “optical and geometric isomers.” Carter presented expert testimony from a chemistry professor arguing that “conformational isomers”—another class of stereoisomers that may exist in adulterated cocaine—could be covered by Georgia’s broader language but not by federal law. He contended that because Georgia law was broader, his convictions could not serve as ACCA predicates.
The district court overruled his objection and applied the ACCA enhancement, sentencing Carter to 210 months of imprisonment. Carter appealed, reasserting his arguments about the definitional mismatch between Georgia and federal cocaine definitions.
The Court’s Holding
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the ACCA enhancement. The court acknowledged that, as a general matter under ACCA’s categorical approach, a state conviction cannot serve as an ACCA predicate if the state law is categorically broader than the federal standard. However, the court held that Carter’s argument failed because the minor premise of his syllogism—that Georgia law defines cocaine more broadly than federal law—cannot affect the outcome in this case.
The dispositive issue was Georgia’s definition of “controlled substance” in its Controlled Substances Act (O.C.G.A. § 16-13-21). That statute defines a controlled substance as a drug listed in Schedules I–V of both Georgia law “and” the federal Code of Federal Regulations. The court emphasized the importance of that “and,” explaining that the Georgia Court of Appeals had authoritatively interpreted this to mean a drug is a “controlled substance” under Georgia law only if it appears on both Georgia and federal schedules. Consequently, even if Georgia’s definition of cocaine itself were broader, any cocaine isomer not on the federal schedules would not qualify as a “controlled substance” under Georgia law at all. Carter therefore could not have been prosecuted or convicted under Georgia’s distribution statute for possessing or distributing such isomers.
The court applied the Supreme Court’s framework from Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez (2007), which requires a “realistic probability” that a state statute would apply to conduct falling outside the federal definition. Here, no such realistic probability existed because the Georgia statute’s application is limited by the requirement that the drug appear on both state and federal schedules. The court also summarily rejected Carter’s secondary argument about ioflupane (included in Georgia’s definition but excluded from federal schedules in 2015) as foreclosed by precedent requiring courts to examine the federal schedules in effect when the defendant committed the offense, not when sentenced.
Key Takeaways
- The ACCA categorical approach requires comparison of statutory definitions, but when state law incorporates federal schedules by reference or requires dual listing, apparent textual differences in defining the underlying substance may have no practical legal effect.
- Georgia courts are the final arbiters of Georgia law, and their interpretation of the conjunction “and” in the controlled substances statute restricts prosecution to federally-scheduled drugs, mooting federal-state definitional mismatches.
- Expert testimony about theoretical chemical possibilities (conformational isomers) does not establish a realistic probability of broader prosecution where state statute language or state court precedent prevents such application.
- For ACCA purposes, the relevant federal drug schedules are those in effect when the defendant committed the predicate offense, not those in effect at sentencing.
Why It Matters
This decision provides important guidance for defendants challenging ACCA enhancements based on alleged state-federal statutory mismatches. While the categorical approach does prohibit the use of broader state convictions as ACCA predicates, courts need not undertake speculative chemical or pharmaceutical analysis when the state statute itself—as interpreted by state appellate courts—forecloses the broader application. The opinion reinforces that formal textual differences are insufficient without showing realistic legal consequences under state law.
The ruling also clarifies that when a state adopts federal drug schedules by reference through conjunction language (“and” rather than “or”), courts may resolve federal-state conflicts by examining how state courts have interpreted the interaction between state and federal lists. This approach economically resolves sentencing disputes without extensive expert testimony about theoretical isomers or chemical categories that would fall outside both jurisdictions’ enforcement scope.