Background
Sherry Killian Duncan sued Gurdip S. Gill asserting that the two had entered into a joint venture to renovate a property owned by Gill. Duncan alleged that the parties had a common purpose, she contributed labor or resources to the project, and the arrangement entitled her to a share of the profits or property value. Her complaint asserted breach of contract, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, imposition of a constructive trust over the property, and a claim under South Carolina’s betterment statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 27-27-10 (Supp. 2025), for the value of improvements she allegedly made.
At trial in York County, Gill moved for a directed verdict on all claims at the close of Duncan’s case. The court granted the motion. Duncan appealed, arguing the court erred in (1) directing a verdict on each cause of action, (2) permitting Gill to reference in his opening statement a proposed contract that Duncan characterized as a settlement offer, and (3) excluding certain out-of-court statements as hearsay.
The Court’s Holding
Affirmed. The Court of Appeals upheld the directed verdict on every claim.
On the joint venture claims, the court applied settled South Carolina law defining a joint venture as requiring (1) a common purpose, (2) community of interest in the object of the enterprise, and (3) an equal right to direct and control the conduct of each other with respect to the common purpose. Peoples Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Myrtle Beach Golf & Yacht Club, 310 S.C. 132 (Ct. App. 1992). Duncan’s own trial evidence established only one inference: she and Gill did not enjoy equal rights to control each other’s conduct in completing the renovation. Because no joint venture existed, the breach of contract, breach by fraudulent act, and constructive trust claims — which were derivative of the joint venture theory — also failed.
The court separately affirmed dismissal of the betterment statute claim. Section 27-27-10 entitles a defendant in an action to recover lands — who purchased the property believing their title to be good — to recover the value of improvements from the plaintiff who prevails in ejectment. Duncan was the plaintiff, not the defendant; Gill owned the property; and there had been no prior final judgment in favor of Gill in an action to recover the lands at issue. The statute simply had no application to her situation.
On the evidentiary issues, the court held Duncan waived her objection to testimony about the alleged settlement contract because she failed to object contemporaneously when Gill referenced it in his opening statement and again when the contract was marked for identification during cross-examination. Duncan herself then testified about the contract on cross-examination and redirect without objecting. A motion in limine is not a final ruling; a contemporaneous objection at the time the evidence is offered is required to preserve the issue. Even if the reference had been improper, no prejudice resulted because the trial court ultimately directed a verdict against Duncan — the settlement evidence did not get to the jury on any substantive question. On the hearsay exclusions, the first excluded statement was properly excluded as hearsay, and the second and third statements that were initially excluded were subsequently admitted into evidence, eliminating any prejudice.
Key Takeaways
- South Carolina requires all three elements of a joint venture to be satisfied: common purpose, community of interest, AND equal right to control each other’s conduct. Absence of the equal-control element is fatal even if the other two are present. Evidence that only one party directed the project or had final authority over the work defeats the joint venture claim as a matter of law.
- South Carolina’s betterment statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 27-27-10, is a defendant’s remedy available only after a plaintiff has obtained a final judgment in an action to recover lands. A plaintiff who made improvements to the defendant’s property cannot invoke the statute to recover the value of those improvements.
- A motion in limine ruling on the admissibility of evidence is not final and does not preserve an evidentiary objection for appeal. Counsel must renew the objection contemporaneously when the evidence is actually offered at trial; failure to do so results in waiver even if the court previously ruled on a pretrial motion addressing the same evidence.
- When allegedly improper settlement evidence reaches the jury and a directed verdict is subsequently granted, any prejudice from the settlement evidence is harmless because there is no issue left for the jury to decide on liability or damages.
Why It Matters
Duncan v. Gill is a useful case study in the recurring fact pattern of informal business arrangements that one party characterizes as a joint venture and the other treats as an arm’s-length service relationship or simple contractor engagement. The decision confirms that South Carolina courts require proof of equal mutual control — not merely shared purpose or economic entanglement — to establish a joint venture. Practitioners advising clients who work on jointly undertaken projects should carefully document each party’s decision-making authority at the outset; an absence of documented equal control rights will defeat the joint venture theory at trial.
The betterment statute holding is a reminder that section 27-27-10 is not a general improvements-reimbursement provision. It operates exclusively as a defense mechanism for defendants in ejectment actions and cannot be repurposed by a plaintiff seeking to recover for renovation work performed on someone else’s property. Contractors and laborers who perform improvements on property belonging to another should look to quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, or mechanic’s lien remedies — not the betterment statute — to recover the value of their work.