Background
Petrobras filed a writ of mandamus challenging a decision by Brazil’s Federal Tax Authority (Delegacia de Maiores Contribuintes — DEMAC/RJ) that assessed income tax (IRPJ) and social contribution tax (CSLL) on SELIC interest rates arising from (1) the withdrawal of judicial deposits held as security, and (2) restitutions of non-tax payments. The first-instance court granted the writ, excluding these SELIC values from taxation and ordering refunds dating to November 2016. The Federal Regional Court (2nd Region) partially overturned that decision.
The Regional Court’s reasoning turned on a distinction established by higher courts: the Supreme Federal Court (STF) had ruled in Theme 962 that SELIC corrections in tax refunds cannot be taxed—but the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) maintained a separate holding that IRPJ and CSLL do apply to SELIC gains on judicial deposit withdrawals. The court applied both rulings and modulated effects to September 30, 2021. Petrobras appealed to the STJ, but its special appeal was rejected by the trial court as duplicating settled jurisprudence (STJ Sumula 83). Petrobras then filed this second-tier appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The STJ Second Panel unanimously declined to hear Petrobras’ appeal, ruling 5–0. The court held that Petrobras had failed to meet the procedural threshold for mounting a valid challenge. Specifically, the court found that Petrobras had not specifically or sufficiently attacked the grounds on which the lower court had rejected its initial appeal. Under STJ Sumula 83, when a lower-court decision aligns with established STJ jurisprudence, the STJ may decline review without additional formal identification of the governing precedent by the court’s President or Vice-President.
The court emphasized that Petrobras bore the burden of demonstrating either (1) that current STJ precedent diverged from the decision below or (2) that the facts of its case were distinguishable from existing rulings. Petrobras did neither: it offered no recent STJ decisions supporting its position and made no argument distinguishing its facts from the precedents cited by the lower court. This omission was fatal. Under Code of Civil Procedure Article 932(III), the reporting judge is required not to know (i.e., not to hear) an appeal that has not specifically attacked all grounds of the decision below. The court applied STJ Sumula 182 to the same effect: “An appeal is not viable if it fails to attack the specific grounds of the decision being appealed.”