Background
Stephen Guzman and Breanne Selin had a child together (A.L.G., born December 14, 2017) and ended their relationship. On January 9, 2020, Stephen filed a petition for allocation of parenting time and responsibilities. Breanne filed a counterpetition on March 9, 2020. The case proceeded through extensive trial and posttrial proceedings spanning multiple years and 15 days of trial, culminating in an allocation order entered in June 2023 that this court previously affirmed in an unpublished decision.
After the allocation order, Stephen petitioned for sanctions under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 in July 2023, asserting that Breanne and her attorney, Michael Canulli, had filed at least 30 repetitive and duplicative motions and petitions for an improper purpose—namely, to cause unnecessary delay and increase litigation costs. During the two-day sanctions hearing in October 2024, Canulli made numerous objections to opposing counsel’s questions, and the trial court warned him against making further “speaking objections.” The trial court subsequently found Canulli in direct criminal contempt for two specific objections made after that warning and imposed a $25 fine for each contempt finding. On March 20, 2025, the trial court awarded $16,257 in sanctions against Breanne and Canulli.
The Court’s Holding
The court reversed the two direct criminal contempt findings against Canulli, holding that the objections cited by the trial court did not rise to the level of violating the admonishment and warranting criminal contempt findings beyond a reasonable doubt. Although Canulli’s conduct was “needlessly combative and undoubtedly slowed the proceedings,” the court found the specific objections at issue—stating legal grounds such as “assumes facts not in evidence,” “would be hearsay,” and “lacks foundation”—did not constitute “drastically improper speaking objections” sufficient to justify direct criminal contempt. The court emphasized that a valid criminal contempt finding requires conduct “calculated to embarrass, hinder or obstruct a court in its administration of justice” and that “a finding of contempt will not stand where it is shown that the attorney acted in good faith to serve her client.”
The court affirmed the $16,257 sanctions award under Rule 137, finding that the trial court properly determined the appellants’ multitude of filings were interposed for an improper purpose. The court noted that appellants repeatedly made the same claims over 30 motions dressed up in different verbiage, including at least nine unsuccessful pleadings based on Stephen’s alleged failure to disclose a pending child with another party. The trial court’s credibility determination that Breanne’s denials were “self-serving and not credible” was entitled to deference.
Regarding other posttrial motions, the court affirmed denials relating to reopening proofs, child support calculations, and allocation of health insurance premiums. However, the court reversed the denial of Breanne’s request to change the minor’s name and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The court also reversed and remanded the award of retroactive child support for recalculation from March 10, 2020, to January 1, 2021, with Stephen to receive credits for voluntary support payments made to Breanne during that period.
Key Takeaways
- Speaking objections—those that inject commentary, argument, or coaching beyond stating a legal ground—are improper and may be prohibited by trial courts, but attorney misconduct must be clearly established to support criminal contempt findings.
- A criminal contempt finding against an attorney requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt and will not stand where the attorney acted in good faith to serve their client, even if the conduct was disruptive.
- Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 sanctions are properly imposed when a party files numerous repetitive and duplicative pleadings for an improper purpose of unnecessary delay and needless expense, and such sanctions may include reasonable attorney fees.
- A trial court’s credibility determinations regarding witness testimony at a sanctions hearing receive substantial deference on appeal and need not be overturned absent clear error.
Why It Matters
This decision establishes important boundaries for when attorney conduct during litigation rises to the level of criminal contempt. While trial courts have clear authority to manage courtroom decorum and prohibit speaking objections, the court makes clear that the bar for contempt findings—particularly when counsel acts in good faith representation—is necessarily high and requires conduct far more egregious than objections that lack optimal conciseness. The decision provides useful guidance to trial judges balancing efficiency with protecting counsel’s ability to make an adequate appellate record.
The decision also reinforces the availability and appropriateness of Rule 137 sanctions as a remedy for abusive litigation tactics, specifically repetitive and duplicative filings designed to harass or impose unnecessary costs on opposing parties. Courts reviewing such sanctions determinations must defer to trial court credibility findings and may sustain sanctions decisions on any grounds supported by the record, not merely those explicitly stated by the trial court. This provides trial courts significant flexibility in managing vexatious litigation while protecting parties from abuse.