Background
Alyssa Reyes-Dudley gave birth to Child C.D. in 2016 at age 19 while unmarried. Throughout Child’s life, Alyssa’s mother, Marie Dudley, served as the primary caregiver and financial supporter. Marie housed Child at her own home four to five nights weekly from infancy, increasing to five to six nights weekly by 2020. Marie handled all school coordination, transportation, paid for private school tuition and supplies, and provided an average of $1,900 per month in support over three years.
In 2020, Alyssa obtained employment an hour and a half away and worked weekdays while returning weekends. In early 2022, Alyssa contracted COVID-19 with prolonged symptoms that left her unable to work through 2024. During this period, Child spent the majority of nights at Marie’s home. In 2023, Alyssa married Nexman Reyes; they had a second child together in 2024. By December 2024, the family began limiting Child’s overnight stays at Marie’s to weekends only.
In June 2025, Nexman was detained and deported to Honduras during an immigration proceeding. Alyssa announced plans to relocate to Honduras with both children to reunite with Nexman. Marie filed an emergency motion for de facto custodianship, concerned about taking Child to a country with high crime rates and a Level 3 travel advisory where he does not speak the language. The circuit court conducted a hearing on August 29, 2025, and issued its order on September 10, 2025.
The Court’s Holding
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s grant of de facto custodian status to Marie Dudley. The court found that Marie met the clear and convincing evidence standard under KRS 403.270(1)(a) by proving she was the primary caregiver and financial supporter of Child for a period exceeding one year. The appellate court applied the high standard required for de facto custodianship, recognizing the superior constitutional right of natural parents, but concluded that the evidence supported the lower court’s factual findings that Alyssa had abdicated her parenting role.
While acknowledging that Alyssa had become more involved in the eight months before the hearing—coinciding with her marriage to Nexman—the court found this insufficient to overcome the prior two to three years of minimal parenting. The evidence showed Alyssa knew Marie would provide care and was willing to relinquish parenting responsibilities. Marie had handled school duties, transportation, daily living and hygiene, food and shelter, and all extras including gifts and extracurricular activities. The circuit court awarded joint custody to Marie and Alyssa, with Alyssa designated as residential custodian, permitting Alyssa to take Child to Honduras with provision for Marie’s time-share visits.
Key Takeaways
- De facto custodianship requires clear and convincing evidence that a non-parent has taken over the role of primary caregiver and financial supporter for the statutory period, literally standing in the place of the natural parent.
- Co-parenting alone is insufficient for de facto status; a parent must have essentially abdicated parental responsibility, not merely shared it with a caregiver.
- Appellate courts defer to trial court factual findings when supported by substantial evidence, particularly regarding witness credibility and the weighing of conflicting testimony.
- Temporary increases in parental involvement, even when coupled with changed family circumstances, do not negate years of de facto custodianship by a grandmother who bore all financial and caregiving responsibilities.
Why It Matters
This decision provides critical guidance on the high burden required to establish de facto custodianship in Kentucky and resolves a split in precedent concerning when co-parenting precludes such status. While Kentucky law consistently recognizes parents’ superior constitutional rights to raise their children, this case clarifies that when a parent knowingly permits a grandparent to assume essentially all parenting and financial responsibilities over years, the parent has effectively abdicated that role sufficiently to support de facto status—regardless of token parenting decisions or recent efforts to reclaim primary care.
The case also illustrates the deference appellate courts afford trial courts in factually intensive family law matters, particularly where competing testimony exists. Trial judges are better positioned to assess credibility and resolve factual disputes, and appellate reversal requires findings that are clearly erroneous—a difficult standard to meet. The decision emphasizes that de facto custodianship is not an easy path and remains exceptional, but the exceptional circumstances here—years of primary care and financial support combined with parental illness, underemployment, and abdication—satisfied that demanding standard.