Background
On August 18, 2019, the appellant, then 19 years old, drove a borrowed Mercedes-Benz SUV on Yonge Street in Toronto at speeds reaching 170 km/h or higher while impaired. He lost control and collided with oncoming traffic. Peyman Masoomi Fard, the driver of one vehicle, died at the scene while his wife and son suffered serious injuries. Another driver was also seriously injured. The appellant and his passenger, Farbod Riazi, escaped the wreckage with only shoulder marks. When police arrived, both men blamed each other for driving. The appellant was charged with criminal negligence causing death, impaired driving causing death, and related charges of criminal negligence and impaired driving causing bodily harm. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to nine years imprisonment.
The central evidentiary question at trial was identity: who was driving? The appellant admitted the vehicle was driven dangerously but denied he was the driver. The Crown’s case relied on evidence that the appellant bore seatbelt injury marks consistent with the driver’s position (left shoulder to right hip), while Riazi bore marks consistent with the passenger’s position (right shoulder to left hip). The key to the Mercedes was found in the appellant’s pocket, and vehicle onboard computer data showed the two men switched seats in a McDonald’s parking lot before the fatal drive.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the convictions and sentence. On the critical issue of identity, the court confirmed the trial judge properly drew inferences from the seatbelt injury evidence without requiring expert testimony. The trial judge was entitled to conclude, based on the totality of the evidence—including the location and pattern of the marks, the key found in the appellant’s pocket, the onboard computer data, and the appellant’s own admissions—that he was driving beyond a reasonable doubt.
On the Charter issue of arrest, the court made significant holdings about the standard for reasonable grounds to believe. The police arrested both men without initially knowing which was the driver. The court held this lawful, clarifying that “reasonable grounds to believe” does not require an officer to be satisfied on a balance of probabilities (51% or greater) that the arrestee committed the offence. Rather, it requires “credibly-based probability”—something less than the civil standard but resting on compelling and credible information. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that when two individuals are equally suspect, the police cannot have reasonable grounds to arrest either. Police may lawfully arrest multiple suspects where either could reasonably be believed to have committed the crime, even if no one is more likely than the other.
The court emphasized that the reasonable grounds standard is practical and contextual, not reducible to mathematical certainty. It must balance individual liberty interests against societal needs for effective law enforcement. On the facts, the police had ample grounds: they knew a serious crime (dangerous driving causing death) had occurred, they knew only two people were in the vehicle, and they reasonably believed either could be the driver.
Key Takeaways
- Circumstantial evidence of seatbelt injuries—the pattern and location of marks—can establish identity without expert testimony when considered in context with other corroborating evidence (key possession, onboard computer data, credibility assessments).
- The “reasonable grounds to believe” standard for arrest requires credibly-based probability, not proof on a balance of probabilities; police need not be more than 50% certain of guilt to arrest.
- Police may lawfully arrest multiple suspects in situations where either could have committed the crime and the identity of the perpetrator is genuinely unclear, provided there is credible basis for believing a crime occurred and each arrestee could be responsible.
- Trial judges may draw common-sense inferences about how seatbelts function and cause injury without crossing into impermissible judicial notice, particularly where lay witnesses (police, paramedics, nurses) have testified to consistent observations.
Why It Matters
This decision provides important clarification on police investigative authority at a critical juncture: the arrest stage. By confirming that reasonable grounds do not demand 51% certainty, and that multiple arrests are lawful where identity is genuinely uncertain, the court has resolved tension in the jurisprudence and affirmed a practical standard that enables law enforcement to investigate complex scenes—such as multi-vehicle collisions—without requiring premature certainty about who is responsible. This is particularly significant in cases involving serious crimes where delay in arrest might allow a culpable person to flee or evidence to be lost.
The decision also reinforces that trial judges have latitude to assess circumstantial evidence using common sense and lived experience. The emphasis on the seatbelt marking evidence as probative, without requiring expert validation, reflects judicial confidence in observational evidence and the reasoning power of experienced fact-finders—a principle with broad implications for evidence law beyond traffic cases.