Background
Robert Tarver, a Department of Children, Youth and Families caseworker, was assigned to investigate allegations of child abuse and oversee the removal of seven children from their mother R.J.’s home in July 2020. At a team meeting on July 9, 2020, Tarver was tasked with helping R.J. obtain a domestic violence protection order and arranging visitation with her three youngest children who had been placed with their grandmother. That evening, Tarver went to R.J.’s house, ostensibly for her safety, and remained there from 5 p.m. to 12:05 a.m., engaging in sexual contact with R.J. throughout the evening while discussing her case and children.
During this time, Tarver spoke about the dependency case, discussed services the Department would provide, and told R.J. he would arrange visitation for the following day. The next day, Tarver notified R.J. she could visit her children but, contrary to normal practice, did not arrange for a visitation supervisor. Three days later, during a shelter care hearing where Tarver testified against returning the children to R.J., he was confronted about the July 9 encounter. Tarver denied visiting R.J.’s house and denied bringing alcohol there. The trial court found these denials false and material to his credibility.
Tarver was charged with receiving unlawful compensation, extortion, and perjury. He was acquitted of extortion but convicted of both perjury and receiving unlawful compensation with sexual motivation. On appeal, he challenged only the unlawful compensation conviction.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed Tarver’s conviction, holding that the trial court correctly interpreted RCW 9A.68.030, which prohibits a public servant from requesting or accepting “compensation for advice or other assistance in preparing a bill, contract, claim, or transaction regarding which he or she knows he or she is likely to have an official discretion to exercise.”
First, the court held that “compensation” as used in the statute is not limited to economic or pecuniary benefits. The ordinary dictionary definition of “compensation”—”the act or action of making up, making good, or counterbalancing”—contains no limitation to financial exchanges. The court rejected Tarver’s argument that compensation and “pecuniary benefit” (used in other sections of the bribery statute) are synonymous. “Compensation” is a broader term encompassing any benefit received as remuneration, including sexual contact. The court distinguished State v. Stockton, where the extortion statute’s defined term “service” was limited by examples, noting that RCW 9A.68.030 neither defines compensation nor provides examples.
Second, the court held that “transaction” includes dependency cases and child visitation arrangements. The ordinary meaning of “transaction” is “a communicative action or activity involving two parties or two things reciprocally affecting or influencing each other.” The dependency case itself qualified as a transaction because it was a communicative activity involving the State and R.J. that reciprocally affected each other. Tarver, as the assigned caseworker, possessed and exercised discretion over the specific details of R.J.’s visitation (dates, times, length, frequency, and supervision), and he advised the superior court through testimony regarding whether the children should be returned to R.J. The court rejected Tarver’s argument that ejusdem generis should limit “transaction” to financial matters similar to bills, contracts, and claims, noting the statute is unambiguous and such a rule applies only to ambiguous statutes.
Key Takeaways
- Sexual contact can constitute “compensation” under Washington’s bribery statute; the statute does not limit compensation to economic benefits.
- Dependency cases and child visitation arrangements are “transactions” within RCW 9A.68.030, not merely enforcement activities excluded from the statute’s scope.
- A public servant’s discretionary authority over case outcomes or visitation terms—exercised while accepting sexual contact as compensation—violates the unlawful compensation statute.
Why It Matters
This decision is significant for public corruption law because it establishes that government officials cannot exploit their discretionary authority over vulnerable citizens in exchange for sexual or other non-economic benefits. The ruling expands the definition of “compensation” beyond the narrower “pecuniary benefit” standard used elsewhere in Washington’s bribery statutes, recognizing that sexual coercion is a distinct harm when combined with official abuse of power. This is particularly important in the child protective services context, where caseworkers exercise substantial discretion over family reunification, visitation, and services.
The court’s broad interpretation of “transaction” also protects vulnerable populations from corruption in dependency proceedings. By treating the dependency case itself and visitation arrangements as transactions subject to the bribery statute, the decision ensures that caseworkers cannot condition essential family services or discretionary decisions on sexual favors. The ruling reinforces that such conduct violates the state’s anti-corruption laws regardless of whether the “compensation” has direct economic value.