Background
Freni Hazare and Dhruv Chokshi died in what gave rise to wrongful death and survival claims against the owners and managers of their apartment complex, BIF-Summerville Station, LLC and PAC-Summerville, LLC. Their personal representatives—Devan Chokshi and Vatsal Chokshi—brought suit in Dorchester County Circuit Court and demanded a jury trial. The landlords moved to strike the jury demand, pointing to a jury trial waiver clause in the apartment lease.
The lease defined the contracting parties as the named residents (“you”) and the owners (“us” or “we”). The waiver provision stated that “you” and “we” agreed to resolve disputes by bench trial. The landlord side of the definition extended to “any of owner’s successor in interest or assigns.” The tenant side contained no equivalent extension to heirs, successors, or assigns. The circuit court denied the motion to strike, holding the waiver did not bind the personal representatives. The landlords appealed the interlocutory denial, and the Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction because orders affecting the right to a jury trial implicate a substantial right requiring immediate review.
The Court’s Holding
Affirmed. A unanimous panel held that the jury trial waiver clause did not bind the decedents’ personal representatives, and therefore the circuit court properly denied the motion to strike.
South Carolina courts apply a strict-construction rule to jury trial waivers. “Trial by jury is a substantial right and any waiver thereof must be strictly construed”; waivers “are always strictly construed and not lightly inferred or extended by implication.” While parties may waive the right to a jury trial by contract, that waiver binds only those who are within its express terms.
Here, the lease’s own definitions made clear who had waived what. “You” referred to the named residents listed at the top of the lease—that is, the original tenants. “We” referred to the owner “or any of owner’s successor in interest or assigns.” The asymmetry was telling: the landlord expressly bound its successors to the waiver, but the tenant side contained no parallel language extending the waiver to the tenants’ heirs or personal representatives. The court read the North Charleston Joint Venture precedent as controlling: “The waiver clause, by its express terms, is applicable only to [the named parties] and [i]t is reasonable to construe [the clause] as not binding” those not expressly named.
The personal representatives sued in their representative capacity on behalf of the decedents’ estates—they were not parties to the original lease and could not be held to a waiver the lease did not purport to impose on them. Under South Carolina’s strict-construction rule, the court would not expand the waiver’s reach by implication to sweep in non-parties simply because they were pursuing claims arising from the leased premises.
Key Takeaways
- South Carolina courts strictly construe contractual jury trial waivers; a waiver applies only to the parties expressly bound by its language and will not be extended by implication to non-parties such as a tenant’s heirs or personal representatives.
- Where a lease waiver defines “you” (tenant) and “we” (owner and owner’s successors) but does not extend “you” to include the tenant’s heirs or successors, the waiver does not bind the tenant’s estate or personal representatives.
- Drafters who want a jury trial waiver to bind estates and successors-in-interest of tenants must expressly say so; courts will enforce asymmetric waiver clauses as written even if the asymmetry was inadvertent.
- An order denying a motion to strike a jury demand—which implicates the right to a jury trial—is immediately appealable as affecting a substantial right, even if the case is otherwise at an interlocutory stage.
Why It Matters
For South Carolina landlords who rely on contractual jury trial waivers, Chokshi is a drafting lesson. A waiver that binds the original tenant under the “you” definition does not automatically carry forward to that tenant’s estate if the tenant dies and wrongful death or survival claims arise. If the landlord wants to require bench trials in that context, the waiver clause must expressly say that it also applies to the tenant’s heirs, executors, administrators, and personal representatives.
The decision also matters for plaintiff’s counsel in cases involving residential apartment injuries or deaths. Where the lease contains a jury trial waiver but the plaintiff sues in a representative capacity (as executor or personal representative), the waiver clause deserves careful scrutiny. If the tenant side of the definition does not extend to successors, the personal representative may be entitled to a jury trial regardless of what the lease says, as Chokshi now confirms.