Background
Ryan Patrick Smith, a stepfather, was charged with two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II) and two counts of domestic violence against his stepdaughters, AS and KP. The prosecution alleged that on numerous occasions, Smith touched AS and KP on their upper inner thighs while they rode in his vehicle—an area he did not touch his biological sons. In 2021, Smith also entered AS’s bedroom, lifted her shirt, and commented on her sports bra; that same morning, he entered KP’s bedroom, threw her over his shoulder, and hit her buttocks while saying “Charlie Horse.” KP additionally accused Smith of touching her vagina with his foot. A jury convicted Smith of two counts of CSC-II and two counts of domestic violence.
On appeal, Smith challenged the admission of evidence under MCL 768.27a(1), a statute permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence of other listed sexual offenses against minors when the defendant faces charges involving such offenses. Smith argued that testimony regarding non-sexual conduct—such as tickling, barging into bedrooms without announcing himself, and placing donuts in the girls’ mouths while they wore towels—was improperly admitted because these acts were not listed offenses. He also challenged the sufficiency of evidence and the exclusion of social media photographs.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Smith’s convictions. The court held that MCL 768.27a(1) creates an exception to the normal rule barring character evidence in criminal cases, permitting the introduction of evidence that a defendant committed other listed sexual offenses against minors. The statute applies when the defendant is accused of a listed offense against a minor and the prosecution provides proper notice. Here, because Smith was on trial for CSC-II—a listed offense—evidence of his similar conduct with other minors was admissible to establish propensity.
The court found that the testimony about Smith touching AS and KP’s inner thighs was properly admitted because it directly proved the elements of CSC-II. Under MCL 750.520a(f), the “inner thigh” qualifies as an intimate part. The fact that Smith touched only his stepdaughters and not his biological sons provided circumstantial evidence that he acted with sexual purpose, defeating any characterization of the conduct as innocent roughhousing. The court also noted that a victim’s testimony in a CSC-II case requires no corroboration, and the jury’s credibility determinations were for the jury alone to make.
Although the court acknowledged that some testimony—specifically regarding Smith barging into the girls’ bedrooms and placing donuts in their mouths—was improperly admitted as other-acts evidence, it held this was harmless error. AS, KP, and their friend CT provided ample admissible testimony that Smith repeatedly touched their intimate body parts without consent, and this core evidence far outweighed the effect of the improperly admitted collateral conduct. The court also upheld exclusion of social media photographs under Michigan Rule of Evidence 403, finding they risked inflaming the jury by suggesting the victim encouraged the abuse.
Key Takeaways
- MCL 768.27a(1) permits introduction of evidence of other listed sexual offenses against minors, creating an exception to the normal bar on propensity evidence in criminal cases.
- The inner thigh is an intimate part under Michigan law; touching it with sexual purpose constitutes sexual contact under MCL 750.520c(1)(b).
- Circumstantial evidence—such as selecting victims of a particular age or sex—can establish that touching was intentional and sexual in nature.
- Admission of some improper evidence does not require reversal if ample other admissible evidence independently supports conviction.
- Trial courts properly may exclude character-impeaching evidence under MRE 403 when it risks unfairly prejudicing a jury in sexual abuse cases.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the broad reach of MCL 768.27a(1) in prosecuting sexual offenses against minors. By permitting evidence of similar conduct with other minors, the statute significantly aids prosecutors in establishing propensity and intent—elements that can be difficult to prove when the alleged abuse leaves no physical evidence. The court’s application clarifies that the statute covers not only explicit sexual acts but also the circumstances surrounding them, such as grooming behavior and patterns of targeting specific victims.
The harmless-error analysis is also instructive: although the court identified some testimony as improperly admitted, it upheld the conviction because the admissible evidence independently and powerfully established guilt. For defendants, this means that evidentiary missteps may not warrant reversal; prosecutors must still build a foundation of properly admitted evidence. For prosecutors, the decision affirms that they have considerable latitude to present a comprehensive picture of a defendant’s pattern of sexual misconduct involving minors, even when individual pieces of evidence fall into gray areas of admissibility.