Background
Jeremy J. Robert was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of G.D., his stepdaughter, and sentenced to 25 years in prison. G.D. made her initial outcry in May 2019 after Robert scolded her for using a cell phone at school without permission.
Robert’s defense theory rested on a pattern-of-lying argument: he sought to introduce evidence that G.D. had previously made a sexual abuse allegation against her grandfather, allegedly to escape consequences for possessing a cell phone at her aunt’s house. Robert argued this prior accusation was false and demonstrated G.D.’s tendency to fabricate abuse allegations whenever she faced discipline.
The trial court excluded the proposed evidence both before and during trial, sustaining the State’s objection. Robert preserved the issue through a bill of exception and appealed, claiming the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and Texas Evidence Rule 613(b) mandated admission.
The Court’s Holding
The Tenth District affirmed the trial court’s exclusion, holding it did not abuse its discretion. The court acknowledged that evidence of false prior accusations may be admissible under the Confrontation Clause to demonstrate a victim’s motive or bias against a defendant—but only if the evidence is probative. Proof of falsity is the operative standard, not mere suspicion or good-faith belief.
The court found no evidence in the record that G.D.’s accusation against her grandfather was false. G.D. testified outside the jury’s presence that her grandfather began assaulting her when she was young and that the assaults ceased when her grandmother changed jobs and worked nights. There was no contradictory evidence. Robert’s arguments—that G.D. delayed her outcry, failed to mention it at her forensic interview and medical exam, and that the indictment was delayed—fell short of proving the prior accusations were false and thus failed to satisfy the probative-evidence requirement.
Because Robert did not properly raise his Rule 613(b) argument at trial, that theory was waived on appeal.
Key Takeaways
- Evidence of prior sexual abuse allegations requires proof of falsity, not suspicion, good-faith belief, or circumstantial timing indicators.
- To be probative, evidence of prior accusations must satisfy two requirements: the prior accusations must be proven false, and they must be similar to the current allegations.
- Delayed outcry, omission from forensic interviews, and prosecutorial delays do not substitute for affirmative proof that prior accusations were false.
- Defendants must clearly identify the evidentiary basis—such as Rule 613(b)—at trial or risk waiver on appeal.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the evidentiary standard governing impeachment through prior accusations in sexual abuse cases. By requiring actual proof of falsity rather than permitting speculation based on timing or circumstantial factors, the court protects vulnerable witnesses from credibility attacks built on inference alone. The holding respects a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights while maintaining a rigorous evidentiary gate that prevents trial-by-innuendo.
For practitioners, Robert reinforces that attacking a victim’s credibility through prior allegations demands concrete evidence of falsity—a significantly higher bar than many defendants initially understand. The decision also underscores the importance of explicit preservation of evidentiary theories at the trial level to avoid waiver.