Background
Samra Adel, a former Afghan refugee and Canadian citizen, was removed from the United States on March 12, 2000 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). She subsequently sought admission on March 28, 2000. In December 2001, she was charged with being inadmissible. An immigration judge found her inadmissible and ordered her removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed her appeal, and Adel petitioned for review in the Fourth Circuit.
Adel raised two primary arguments: that the BIA’s finding of willful misrepresentation to gain admission was factually unsupported, and that the BIA committed legal error in finding her inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i).
The Court’s Holding
The Fourth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to review Adel’s factual challenge regarding misrepresentations because she was deemed inadmissible by reason of a criminal offense covered under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D), when a petitioner is inadmissible for criminal conduct, the court may only review constitutional questions and questions of law, not factual findings.
On Adel’s legal argument regarding inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i), the court found no legal error. That statute provides that a noncitizen ordered removed who “again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal” is inadmissible. Adel was removed March 12, 2000, and sought admission March 28, 2000—clearly within the five-year window. When charged in December 2001, she remained within the statutory five-year period of inadmissibility. The statute creates a temporary bar, not a permanent one, but Adel’s circumstances fell squarely within it.
Key Takeaways
- Jurisdictional limits apply when reviewing removal orders based on criminal inadmissibility grounds—courts cannot revisit factual findings, only legal and constitutional questions.
- The five-year “prior removal” bar under § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) begins from the date of removal and applies to any subsequent admission sought within that window.
- Seeking admission just days after removal—as Adel did (March 28 after March 12 removal)—triggers the inadmissibility bar for the entire five-year period.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the narrow scope of appellate review available to immigrants challenging removal orders. The statutory bar to admission for those previously removed is rigidly applied based on the calendar, with no judicial discretion to override timing-based inadmissibility. For practitioners, the decision clarifies that jurisdictional bars under § 1252(a)(2) significantly limit what appellate courts can review when criminal inadmissibility is at issue.
The ruling also underscores that a prior removal creates a bright-line, five-year period during which any attempt to seek admission will render an individual statutorily inadmissible. The court found no ambiguity in the statutory language and declined to second-guess the BIA’s application of this clear rule.