Background
The 4310-4322 N. Clarendon Condominium Association sued unit owner David Klein in March 2024 for violations of the condominium’s declaration and bylaws spanning over five years. Klein appeared and was granted a full waiver of court fees by the circuit court based on his limited income under the fee waiver provision of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/5-105). The Association moved for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted.
Following the judgment, the Association filed a petition for attorney fees and costs totaling $23,897.23, seeking recovery pursuant to both the Declaration and the Condominium Property Act (765 ILCS 605/1 et seq.). Klein argued that his statutory fee waiver provided “immunity” from these fees and costs. The Association countered that the fee waiver applied only to court-imposed costs, not to attorney fees and costs owed to an opposing party under statute or contract. The circuit court agreed and awarded the Association full fees on September 11, 2025.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court affirmed, holding that the fee waiver provision of the Code of Civil Procedure extends only to payments directly related to using the court system—such as clerk fees, service of process, translation services, and costs of mandatory court processes—not to attorney fees owed to an opposing party. The court emphasized that the statutory language covers payments “imposed on a party in connection with the prosecution or defense of a civil action,” which the title and specific enumerated examples demonstrate applies only to court system costs, not liabilities to opposing parties.
The court applied the ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction, finding that while the statute’s listed fees are not exhaustive, any additional fees covered must be “of the same kind” as those specifically listed—all of which are costs imposed by the court or inherent in litigation. Attorney fees owed to an opposing party, by contrast, arise from express statutory or contractual provisions and are fundamentally different in nature.
The court distinguished the case from In re Marriage of Main, where transcript fees on appeal were waived, noting that transcript costs are directly necessary to pursue an appeal and thus similar to enumerated court costs, and that Main involved a statutory scheme harmonizing two related fee waiver provisions. No such reasoning applied here. The court rejected Klein’s policy argument, finding nothing in the fee waiver statute’s language, history, or purpose suggesting it was meant to insulate indigent litigants from contractual or statutory liability to opposing parties.
Key Takeaways
- Illinois’s fee waiver statute protects low-income litigants only from court system costs, not from attorney fees or costs awarded to opposing parties under statute or contract.
- The ejusdem generis rule limits the scope of “other” fees under the waiver to those of the same character as specifically enumerated costs.
- Illinois follows the “American rule,” which requires express statutory or contractual authorization before attorney fees can be recovered from an opponent.
- Even indigent litigants remain liable for fees mandated by statute or contract when they lose litigation.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the practical limits of indigent fee waivers in Illinois practice. While the fee waiver provision advances access to justice by eliminating court system costs for low-income litigants, it does not shield them from substantive legal liabilities to opposing parties. Condominium associations and other entities seeking to enforce statutory or contractual fee provisions need not worry that a defendant’s fee waiver status will eliminate their right to recover attorney fees in litigation.
The holding also reflects the court’s careful application of statutory interpretation principles. By applying ejusdem generis and examining the statute’s enumerated examples, the court resisted a broader reading that would have created an end-run around the American rule’s requirement of express authorization for attorney fees. The decision affirms that fee waivers are a procedural safeguard for access to court, not a substantive shield against the legal consequences of losing.