Background
Patrick King played a significant leadership role in the Freedom Convoy protest in Ottawa between January 28 and February 20, 2022. With over 300,000 social media followers, King directed strategy and encouraged hundreds of transport trucks and protesters to occupy downtown Ottawa roads near Parliament Hill, creating gridlock that lasted three weeks. King personally organized logistics, coordinated fuel and food, moved trucks to block key streets (including Kent Street and the Ottawa airport), and encouraged the use of truck air horns to disrupt residents, businesses, emergency services, and public transit.
King was convicted at trial of counselling mischief, mischief, counselling obstruction of police, counselling disobedience of court orders, and disobeying court orders (specifically, two injunctions prohibiting air horn use). However, the trial judge acquitted him on a charge of intimidation by blocking or obstructing a highway under Criminal Code section 423(1)(g), holding that such conduct during a political protest—absent threats or violence—did not constitute the crime of intimidation and that the government could not be a “person” compelled under the statute.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed three critical errors of law in interpreting section 423(1)(g). First, the trial judge wrongly required proof of threats or violence as an element of the offence when blocking a highway. The court noted that such a requirement would render section 423(1)(g) redundant, since violence and threats are already prohibited separately under subsections (a) and (b). The specific intent element does not require proof of intent to intimidate individuals; it only requires proof that the blocking was done for the purpose of compelling another person to abstain from lawful conduct.
Second, the trial judge erred by treating participation in a political protest as a defence to criminal liability. The court held that “criminal conduct is not less criminal because it occurs during a lawful protest” and that “the right to peaceful protest does not include the right to engage in otherwise criminal conduct in support of protest goals.” The court emphasized that blocking highways as a “self-help remedy” is inherently wrongful conduct that undermines the rule of law.
Third, the trial judge erred in holding that the government cannot be compelled as “a person” under section 423(1). Based on the trial judge’s factual findings that King participated in and encouraged highway blockade with the purpose of pressuring the government to abandon COVID-19 mandates, all elements of section 423(1)(g) were established beyond reasonable doubt. The court substituted a conviction.
Key Takeaways
- Political protest activity does not shield criminal conduct from prosecution; Charter-protected expression must remain lawful to retain protection.
- Highway obstruction intimidation under section 423(1)(g) does not require proof of threats, violence, or intent to intimidate individuals—only the intent to compel another to abstain from lawful conduct.
- The government may be a “person” capable of being compelled for purposes of section 423(1) intimidation charges.
- Blocking or obstructing highways without lawful authority is inherently wrongful conduct, even absent additional civil or criminal wrongs.
Why It Matters
This decision establishes that Canadian criminal law does not carve out an exception for conduct occurring during political protests. While Charter-protected expression is jealously guarded, it operates only within lawful bounds. The judgment clarifies that organizers and participants in disruptive occupations may face intimidation charges based on the inherent wrongfulness of highway obstruction, regardless of their political motivations. This has significant implications for future large-scale civil disobedience campaigns, which cannot rely on the political nature of protest to immunize criminal conduct.
The court’s insistence on statutory interpretation faithful to the text of section 423(1)—rejecting the trial judge’s attempt to read in additional requirements based on policy concerns about chilling political expression—reinforces the principle that judges should not amend legislation, even for sympathetic reasons. The case balances the right to protest with the rule of law and public order.