Background
A jury convicted Stephen Robert Stark of second-degree sexual abuse in 2019 based on allegations that he repeatedly touched a five-year-old child’s genitals over clothing. Stark admitted contact with the child’s genital area but maintained that it occurred accidentally during horseplay and was not sexually motivated. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction on direct appeal.
Stark later sought post-conviction relief. He argued that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing a juror to serve despite her being the investigating and testifying detective’s second cousin. He also challenged an instruction stating that the alleged victim’s testimony did not require corroboration, contending that State v. Kraai and State v. Mathis should apply retroactively, and asserted a freestanding claim of actual innocence. The district court denied relief.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Stark failed to establish ineffective assistance because the juror was not subject to removal for cause, said she could evaluate the detective’s testimony fairly, and had not spoken with him in years. A distant familial relationship to a detective did not itself establish bias, and Stark failed to prove either deficient performance or prejudice.
The court also rejected Stark’s jury-instruction claim. His appellate argument that Kraai and Mathis merely explained an old rule was not preserved because he had argued below that those decisions created a new rule. Addressing the preserved theory, the court held that the decisions could not apply retroactively on collateral review because they announced a procedural rule that satisfied neither exception under the Teague framework.
Finally, Stark failed to prove actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. He presented no new evidence and repeated the same explanation the trial jury had rejected. Given the child’s testimony, Stark’s admissions, and evidence that he and the child were alone behind a locked bedroom door, a reasonable fact finder could conclude the touching was sexually motivated.
Key Takeaways
- A juror’s distant familial relationship to a testifying detective does not establish bias without additional evidence of partiality.
- A post-conviction applicant cannot raise a new retroactivity theory on appeal that was neither argued to nor decided by the district court.
- Kraai and Mathis did not retroactively invalidate Stark’s final conviction on collateral review.
- An actual-innocence claim requires clear and convincing proof that no reasonable fact finder could convict; repeating trial testimony without new evidence was insufficient.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores the demanding standards governing collateral attacks on final convictions. Defendants alleging juror bias must show more than a remote relationship to a participant in the case, and claims concerning later changes in procedural law generally cannot reopen a final conviction.
It also illustrates the high burden for freestanding actual-innocence claims in Iowa: a post-conviction court does not simply reweigh the trial evidence, particularly when the applicant offers no new evidence and a reasonable jury could still find guilt.