Background
William Rhodes-Hamby (“Father”) and Anya Askew (“Mother”) divorced in February 2024. Their consent decree provided for joint legal decision-making, gave Father final decision-making authority, and awarded the parents equal parenting time. Before and after the divorce, Father obtained protective orders against Mother based on domestic-violence findings, and Mother was convicted of criminal trespass arising from an incident supporting the first protective order.
In October 2025, Mother sought modification of legal decision-making and parenting time. She alleged that Father had excluded her from the child’s medical and mental-health care and that the child had suffered several incidents of unexplained bruising or abuse while in Father’s care. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court temporarily awarded Mother sole legal decision-making authority and limited Father to therapeutically supervised parenting time. The orders allowed a court-appointed therapist to determine the frequency and duration of Father’s visits, within a maximum of two two-hour visits per week, and to decide when Father and the child no longer needed family therapy.
Father sought special-action review. The Court of Appeals initially vacated the entire temporary order, but after granting Mother’s motion for reconsideration in part, it replaced that decision with this memorandum decision. The court declined jurisdiction over Father’s challenge to the temporary legal decision-making award but retained jurisdiction over the parenting-time issue.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals held that the superior court improperly delegated its judicial authority by allowing the therapist to control the frequency, duration, and termination of Father’s therapeutically supervised parenting time. Although a court may consider expert opinions and establish milestones for expanded or unsupervised parenting time, the court itself must exercise independent judgment unless those milestones operate automatically without a professional making the ultimate decision.
The court rejected the argument that the delegation was permissible because the orders were temporary. Determining a child’s best interests remains the court’s responsibility even on an interim basis. The orders’ statements that the therapist was not making parenting-time recommendations did not cure the problem because, in practical effect, the therapist could decide whether Father received between zero and four hours of parenting time per week and whether he would have to return to court to obtain any further parenting time. The court therefore vacated the parenting-time provisions and remanded for further proceedings.
Key Takeaways
- A family court may rely on expert input but may not delegate the ultimate parenting-time decision to a therapist or other behavioral-health professional.
- The rule against delegating best-interests determinations applies to temporary parenting-time orders as well as final orders.
- Labels and disclaimers do not control when an order’s practical effect gives a provider discretion over the amount or continuation of a parent’s time with a child.
Why It Matters
The decision clarifies that courts must retain control over interim parenting arrangements even when therapeutic supervision is warranted. A court may prescribe objective, self-effectuating conditions for changes in parenting time, but it cannot make a therapist’s independent judgment the event that determines a parent’s access to the child.
The decision is an unpublished memorandum decision and is not precedential under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 111(c), although it may be cited as that rule permits.