Queensland Racing Integrity Commission — ordered to pay the Appeals Panel’s costs

Case
Queensland Racing Integrity Commission v Queensland Racing Appeals Panel (No 2)
Court
Supreme Court of Queensland (Australia)
Date Decided
24 July 2026
Citation
[2026] QSC 178
Topics
Costs, Judicial review, Public interest litigation, Racing regulation

Background

The Queensland Racing Integrity Commission unsuccessfully sought statutory review of a decision by the Queensland Racing Appeals Panel. The Panel had set aside a decision made by the Commission’s stewards. On 15 June 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed the Commission’s review application.

The remaining dispute concerned costs. The Commission argued that each party should bear its own costs because the proceeding raised a novel and genuinely arguable question about Part 4 of the Racing Integrity Act 2016 (Qld), was brought in discharge of its statutory responsibilities rather than for private advantage, and produced guidance for the Act’s future administration. The Panel sought its costs on the standard basis, relying on the ordinary rule that costs follow the event.

The Court’s Holding

Burns SJA ordered the Commission to pay the Panel’s costs of the application, to be assessed on the standard basis if not agreed. Although the case raised a question of some novelty and general importance, and the Commission’s statutory construction was properly arguable, those features were not special or exceptional circumstances justifying departure from the ordinary costs rule.

The Court found that the Commission was not a disinterested public-interest litigant: it had participated in the Panel proceeding, and the Panel had set aside the decision of the Commission’s own stewards. The resulting clarification of the law was an ordinary by-product of resolving the Commission’s unsuccessful construction argument. The Panel’s restrained participation, limited consistently with the Hardiman principles, did not disentitle it to costs because its submissions were needed to provide balanced argument in the absence of another active contradictor.

Key Takeaways

  • A novel, arguable question of statutory construction and the public benefit of legal clarification do not, without more, displace the ordinary rule that costs follow the event.
  • A public authority may have a real and direct interest in judicial review litigation when the challenged decision concerns its participation and overturns a decision made by its officials.
  • A tribunal or panel that participates within the limits imposed by the Hardiman principles may recover costs when its submissions are necessary to ensure balanced argument.

Why It Matters

The decision confirms that public bodies bringing administrative-law proceedings ordinarily face the same costs consequences as other unsuccessful litigants. Performing statutory responsibilities, advancing a properly arguable interpretation, and obtaining useful guidance for future administration will not ordinarily amount to exceptional circumstances.

It also shows that appropriately limited participation by a decision-making body can attract a costs award where there is no active contradictor and the body’s submissions assist the court in resolving the legal issue.

⬇ Download the original opinion (PDF)Archived from the court's official source.
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