United States v. Williams — Sixth Circuit affirms felon-in-possession conviction and sentence, finding unconditional guilty plea waived most appeal rights

Case
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RISHAD WILLIAMS, aka Rashad Williams, Defendant-Appellant.
Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Judge
READLER, Circuit Judge (Donald Trump, 2019)
Date Decided
July 24, 2026
Docket No.
25-3209
Topics
Criminal Procedure, Guilty Pleas, Appellate Waivers, Sentencing
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Rishad Williams, a convicted felon, was arrested after his girlfriend, Asia Amaya, told police he had assaulted her and threatened her with her own handgun during an argument. Following his arrest, a federal grand jury indicted Williams on one count of possessing a firearm as a felon. While arresting him on the federal warrant, officers discovered a second weapon in Amaya’s home: a stolen semi-automatic rifle with a 100-round drum magazine.

The government offered Williams a plea agreement for the first charge, which would have resulted in a lower sentence, but his attorney declined it. Prosecutors then obtained a superseding indictment charging Williams with two counts of being a felon in possession. Williams later claimed his attorney never informed him of the initial, more favorable plea offer. After the district court denied his motions to suppress the rifle and dismiss the indictment, Williams pleaded guilty to both counts without a written plea agreement.

At sentencing, the district court applied a four-level enhancement because Williams possessed the handgun “in connection with another felony offense”—namely, felonious assault against Amaya. Despite Amaya providing a later affidavit recanting her initial story, the court credited her original statements to police, which were supported by other evidence. The court sentenced Williams to 100 months in prison. Williams appealed, raising Second, Fourth, and Sixth Amendment challenges, and contesting the sentencing enhancement.

The Court’s Holding

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held that by entering an unconditional guilty plea, Williams waived his right to appeal any non-jurisdictional issues that occurred before the plea. This rule barred his claims that the indictment violated the Second Amendment and that the discovery of the rifle violated the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the district judge’s oral statements suggesting Williams was “not waiving any of [his] appellate rights” were not enough to create a “conditional plea” under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), which requires a written agreement preserving specific issues for appeal.

The court also declined to address Williams’s Sixth Amendment claim that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to communicate the government’s initial plea offer. Following its standard practice, the court ruled that such claims are best handled through collateral review (such as a habeas corpus proceeding), where the factual record can be fully developed, rather than on direct appeal where the record is limited to pretrial and trial proceedings.

Finally, the court upheld the sentencing enhancement. It ruled that the district court did not clearly err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Williams used the handgun in connection with a felonious assault. The district court was entitled to credit Amaya’s original, emotional statements to police—which were corroborated by physical evidence and her own text messages—over her later, inconsistent affidavit. The court found ample evidence supported the district court’s conclusion that Amaya’s initial statement had greater “indicia of reliability.”

Key Takeaways

  • An unconditional guilty plea serves as a broad waiver of a defendant’s right to appeal most pre-plea issues, including constitutional challenges to the indictment or evidence.
  • To preserve issues for appeal after a guilty plea, a defendant must enter into a formal, written conditional plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2); a judge’s ambiguous oral statements are insufficient to do so.
  • Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally not resolved on direct appeal and must be raised in a separate collateral proceeding where evidence about the attorney’s conduct can be presented.
  • A sentencing court may rely on a witness’s original incriminating statements to police over a later recantation, especially when the initial statements are corroborated by other evidence and there is reason to doubt the credibility of the recantation.

Why It Matters

This case serves as a critical reminder of the finality of an unconditional guilty plea. It reinforces the strict procedural requirements for preserving appeal rights, clarifying that informal remarks from a judge cannot override the written consent mandated by Rule 11(a)(2). The decision underscores that defendants who plead guilty without a formal conditional plea agreement forfeit their ability to challenge most prior constitutional violations, making the decision to plead unconditionally a point of no return for those issues.

Furthermore, the ruling reinforces the established procedural pathway for ineffective assistance of counsel claims, channeling them toward collateral review proceedings where a proper evidentiary record can be built. This prevents appellate courts from having to decide fact-intensive claims based on an incomplete record. For sentencing purposes, the opinion affirms the district court’s role as the primary fact-finder, granting it significant discretion to weigh conflicting witness statements and rely on corroborated hearsay, even when a witness later changes their story.

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