Background
James Aren Duckett was convicted nearly forty years ago of the sexual battery and first-degree murder of eleven-year-old Teresa McAbee and was sentenced to death. After Governor Ron DeSantis signed a death warrant in February 2026, Duckett sought postconviction relief and DNA testing of a small sample containing sperm heads that had been taken from the victim’s underwear. The circuit court allowed that testing, and the Florida Supreme Court stayed the execution while it was completed. The results did not exonerate Duckett, and the court later affirmed the denial of his fifth successive postconviction motion and lifted the stay.
Duckett then filed a second post-warrant DNA-testing motion seeking analysis of additional items, including cuttings from the victim’s clothing, vaginal swabs and smears, fingernail scrapings, and associated packaging. He also filed a sixth successive postconviction motion alleging that the State violated due process by choosing a Florida laboratory that used a ForenSeq Kintelligence Kit instead of sending the original sample to a Texas laboratory for whole-genome sequencing. The Florida testing consumed the small, deteriorated sample, as the parties had anticipated it would. The circuit court summarily denied both new motions.
The Court’s Holding
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the new DNA-testing motion on both procedural and substantive grounds. The request was procedurally barred because Duckett knew about the additional items when he filed his earlier testing motion but gave no valid reason for waiting more than four months to request their testing. It also failed on the merits because prior examination showed that the items contained no identifiable or testable genetic material, so the motion did not identify physical evidence containing DNA as required by section 925.11, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853.
The court also rejected Duckett’s due-process claim under Arizona v. Youngblood. Assuming without deciding that Youngblood applies in the postconviction context, the court held that Duckett failed to show the State intentionally destroyed evidence it believed would exonerate him. The State agreed to use newer testing available only through a private laboratory; all parties knew the sample would be consumed and might produce inconclusive results; and the State gave reasonable grounds for preferring Florida testing, including keeping the sample in-state, avoiding further delay, and believing the selected laboratory could adequately test it. The court therefore affirmed the denial of Duckett’s sixth successive postconviction motion and denied a stay of execution.
Key Takeaways
- A successive request for postconviction DNA testing may be procedurally barred when the prisoner knew about the evidence during an earlier request and offers no valid reason for the delay.
- Florida’s postconviction DNA-testing procedure requires identification of physical evidence containing testable DNA; items previously found to contain no identifiable genetic material do not satisfy that requirement.
- Even assuming Youngblood applies after conviction, consumption of a sample during requested testing does not establish bad faith without evidence that the State intentionally destroyed material it believed would be exculpatory.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces strict procedural and evidentiary limits on successive DNA-testing requests, particularly in death-warrant litigation. It also indicates that the foreseeable consumption of a small sample during defense-requested testing will not, without proof of intentional suppression of exculpatory evidence, support a due-process claim.
Justice Labarga concurred but rejected Justice Tanenbaum’s characterization of the postconviction motion as frivolous and his suggestion that counsel face possible sanctions. Justice Tanenbaum concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the postconviction motion should have been rejected as time-barred and frivolous and that the DNA-testing appeal should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.