Background
Douglas and Marilyn Hubert bought a 2014 Jeep Grand Cherokee from Auffenberg Nissan in June 2015. The dealership advertised the Jeep as a “select certified” used vehicle, provided a clean Carfax report, and stated that the vehicle had passed a 142-point inspection. The Carfax report warned that it contained only information reported to Carfax as of June 15, 2015.
When the Huberts traded in the Jeep in 2022, an updated Carfax report showed two accidents predating their purchase, reducing the vehicle’s trade-in value. Carfax had not received information about either accident until after the sale. The Huberts sued Auffenberg under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and for common-law fraud, alleging that the dealership learned of the accidents through its inspection, concealed them, and misrepresented the clean Carfax report. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Auffenberg, and the Huberts abandoned their common-law-fraud claim on appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court affirmed. It concluded that deposition testimony created a factual dispute over whether Auffenberg represented that the Jeep’s “select certified” status and 142-point inspection meant the vehicle had never been wrecked. But that dispute was not material to the Consumer Fraud Act claim as pleaded.
The first amended complaint alleged that Auffenberg knew about the prior accidents through its inspection and concealed that knowledge. It did not specifically allege the theory advanced in opposition to summary judgment: that Auffenberg knowingly misrepresented the purpose or significance of the 142-point inspection by saying it ruled out prior accidents when it did not. Because a plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment with a new factual or legal theory not pleaded in the complaint, the disputed testimony could not preclude judgment for Auffenberg.
Key Takeaways
- A genuine factual dispute defeats summary judgment only if the disputed fact is material to a claim actually pleaded.
- A plaintiff cannot introduce a new theory of liability through a response or supplemental response to a summary-judgment motion.
- A Consumer Fraud Act claim must identify the alleged misrepresentation with the particularity required for common-law fraud.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that evidence developed in discovery cannot preserve a claim if it supports only an unpleaded theory. A plaintiff who uncovers a materially different theory should seek leave to amend the complaint rather than first asserting that theory in summary-judgment briefing.
The order was issued under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is nonprecedential except in the limited circumstances permitted by Rule 23(e)(1).