Background
Appellant Christopher Matthew Vickers and Appellee Lena Cherie Chaisson-Munoz are the parents of a four-year-old child. They were named joint managing conservators with shared possession of the child under an agreed order. In late 2025 and early 2026, Appellee filed two separate applications for protective orders against Appellant, alleging family violence and child abuse, including an allegation that the child was sexually abused by Appellant’s friend.
These protective order applications were eventually transferred to the 444th District Court, where an existing Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR) modification petition (Cause No. 2023-DCL-01268) was pending. The parties “acquiesced that the Court hear all three causes at the same time.” After a hearing, the trial court signed a “Corrected Protective Order” on February 12, 2026, which included all three cause numbers in its style. Appellant subsequently filed appeals from this protective order.
The Court’s Holding
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals dismissed Christopher Matthew Vickers’ appeals from the protective orders for want of jurisdiction. The court emphasized its inherent power and obligation to ascertain jurisdiction, noting that appellate jurisdiction generally applies only to final judgments or specifically authorized interlocutory orders.
Citing Texas Family Code § 81.009(c), the court explained that a protective order rendered in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR) may not be appealed until the SAPCR order providing for child support, possession, or access becomes a final, appealable order. In this case, the protective order was explicitly consolidated with and included the cause number of Appellee’s pending petition to modify the parent-child relationship. Because the SAPCR modification petition remained pending and the trial court “clearly envisions additional proceedings,” the protective order was deemed an interlocutory order and, therefore, not immediately appealable under the Family Code.
Key Takeaways
- Appellate courts must confirm their jurisdiction before proceeding with an appeal.
- Appeals are generally limited to final judgments, with narrow statutory exceptions for interlocutory orders.
- Under Texas Family Code § 81.009(c), a protective order issued in a SAPCR is an interlocutory order and cannot be appealed until the SAPCR’s final order concerning child support, possession, or access is rendered.
- Consolidation of protective order applications with a pending SAPCR effectively ties the appealability of the protective order to the finality of the overarching SAPCR.
Why It Matters
This ruling is significant for attorneys practicing family law in Texas, particularly concerning protective orders and appellate procedure. It reiterates the strict interpretation of appellate jurisdiction, especially regarding interlocutory orders, and highlights that protective orders issued within the context of a pending SAPCR are generally not immediately appealable.
Practitioners must ensure that the underlying SAPCR has reached a final, appealable stage before attempting to appeal a protective order that is intertwined with it. Failure to do so, as demonstrated here, will result in dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, thereby delaying resolution and potentially incurring additional legal costs for clients.