Background
April Lynn Gomez was charged with two counts of aggravated driving under the influence based on driving with a suspended license. She attended a June 2019 conference at which the superior court set trial for September 9, 2019, and warned that trial could proceed in her absence. After her attorney obtained a continuance, however, the court rescheduled trial for November 13, 2019, by minute entry. The record did not show that Gomez received notice of the new date.
Gomez did not attend the rescheduled trial. Although substitute counsel objected and sought a continuance, the superior court found her absence voluntary based solely on the warning and original trial date provided in June. A jury convicted Gomez on both counts. She was arrested four-and-a-half years later and sentenced to concurrent ten-year prison terms.
Because Gomez’s prolonged absence delayed sentencing, a statute potentially restricted her right to a direct appeal. Rather than remand for a hearing on appellate jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals accepted special-action jurisdiction and reached whether the trial properly proceeded without her.
The Court’s Holding
The court held that whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to be present at trial is reviewed de novo. Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.1, a court may infer voluntary absence when the defendant had actual notice of the proceeding’s date and time, notice of the right to attend, and notice that the proceeding could continue in the defendant’s absence.
The record did not support the superior court’s finding that Gomez voluntarily waived her right to attend. The court had not adequately investigated or made a record concerning whether Gomez actually knew of the November trial date. Notice of the superseded September date was insufficient by itself, and the existing record did not establish that Gomez would have stayed away even if she had known the correct date.
Because Gomez was absent from the entire trial, the majority held that the error was structural and required automatic reversal. It added that the error would not have been harmless in any event because Gomez had disputed that she was the driver, a third party had claimed responsibility, and her presence could have affected testimony, witness presentation, cross-examination, and trial strategy. The court reversed the convictions and sentences and remanded for a new trial.
Key Takeaways
- Actual notice of an original trial date does not alone establish actual notice of a later rescheduled trial under Rule 9.1.
- Before finding a defendant voluntarily absent, the trial court must adequately investigate and create a record concerning the defendant’s knowledge of the correct trial date and the circumstances of the absence.
- A defendant’s involuntary absence from the entire trial is structural error requiring automatic reversal.
- The partial dissent agreed that the existing voluntariness finding was inadequate but would have ordered an evidentiary hearing before granting a new trial.
Why It Matters
The decision clarifies that Arizona appellate courts review waiver of the constitutional right to be present de novo and that trial courts cannot rely mechanically on warnings tied to an obsolete trial date. Courts must develop a record showing actual knowledge of the operative date or circumstances demonstrating that the defendant would not have appeared regardless of notice.
The ruling also underscores the severe consequence of an unsupported trial-in-absentia determination: when the defendant misses the entire trial involuntarily, later factfinding or judicial-efficiency concerns will not preserve the convictions.