Background
Kosta Lakovic was convicted by a jury of second-degree criminal sexual conduct involving KC, a 15-year-old member of the household in which he lived. KC testified that Lakovic entered the bedroom where she was napping, placed his hand under her blanket, and squeezed and groped her upper thigh and between her legs. During a police interview, Lakovic admitted touching KC and acknowledged that she grabbed his wrist and asked him to stop, but he denied groping her.
At trial, the prosecution also introduced testimony about Lakovic’s interactions with other teenage girls in the household. The evidence included testimony that he touched TP’s breast during a pool game, made sexual comments, asked two girls to draw a penis as part of a game, referenced a sexually explicit song, and touched SP’s waist. A detective also gave a general definition of “grooming,” although the detective did not testify that Lakovic had groomed anyone.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. It held that testimony about Lakovic touching TP’s breast was admissible under MCL 768.27a because a jury could find that the conduct constituted fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, a listed offense against a minor. Its probative value concerning Lakovic’s propensity to touch young girls in his household inappropriately was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
The remaining other-acts evidence did not describe listed offenses and therefore was not admissible under MCL 768.27a. The court nevertheless concluded that it was admissible under MRE 404(b) to show intent, motive, plan, scheme, or system and to provide context relevant to KC’s credibility. Although the trial court abused its discretion by admitting that evidence without conducting the required MRE 404(b) analysis, the error was harmless because the evidence itself was admissible, Lakovic had notice and an opportunity to object, and the jury received a limiting instruction.
The detective’s definition of grooming was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, making its admission erroneous. But that error was also harmless because the reference was brief, did not accuse Lakovic of grooming, and was later emphasized by the defense. Finally, KC’s account of Lakovic placing his hand under the blanket and groping her inner thigh while she lay in bed permitted a rational jury to find that the touching was intentional and for a sexual purpose. Her testimony alone could sustain the conviction.
Key Takeaways
- MCL 768.27a permits evidence of another listed sexual offense against a minor, even without a charge or conviction, and allows the jury to consider its propensity inference.
- Conduct that does not qualify as a listed offense under MCL 768.27a may still be admissible under MRE 404(b) for a proper noncharacter purpose, including intent or a common plan or system.
- Brief, improperly admitted grooming testimony did not require reversal where it did not specifically accuse the defendant of grooming and the defense itself highlighted the subject.
- A victim’s uncorroborated testimony can support a CSC-II conviction, and the manner and circumstances of touching may establish its sexual purpose through reasonable inference.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes Michigan’s statutory rule allowing propensity evidence in cases involving listed sexual offenses against minors from the separate framework governing other acts under MRE 404(b). Trial courts must identify the correct basis for admission and conduct the corresponding analysis, even when the evidence ultimately could be admitted under another rule.
The opinion also illustrates the scope of harmless-error review. Evidentiary mistakes will not require a new trial when the challenged evidence was otherwise admissible or played only a minor role, and the properly admitted evidence independently supported the verdict.