Tenenbaum v. Levy — Supreme Court denied leave to appeal a sexual-harassment judgment

Case
Gal Hezekiah Tenenbaum v. Maya Lee Levy
Court
Supreme Court of Israel (Israel)
Date Decided
August 4, 2026
Citation
LCA 17167-12-25
Topics
Sexual harassment, Social media, Consent, Appellate review

Background

Maya Lee Levy sued Gal Hezekiah Tenenbaum under Israel’s Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, alleging repeated direct communications and social-media posts about her body, weight, breast size, appearance, and sexuality. Among other conduct, Tenenbaum continued contacting Levy after she told him to stop, recorded and published interactions with her, and posted videos saying that he wanted to see her naked and discussing cosmetic procedures that could “improve” her body.

The Magistrates’ Court found that approximately 20 posts and communications constituted clear and serious sexual harassment. It awarded Levy NIS 80,000 in statutory damages without proof of loss, plus NIS 10,000 in costs and attorney’s fees, and permanently barred Tenenbaum from contacting her or publishing material identifying or referring to her, her body, or her sexuality. The Central District Court rejected Tenenbaum’s appeal; Levy withdrew her cross-appeal challenging the amount of damages.

Tenenbaum sought permission for a third-tier appeal. He argued principally that Levy’s own public body-image content weakened her harassment claim or implied consent to his posts, and that this issue presented an unresolved question concerning section 3(a)(5A) of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law. He also challenged the injunction on free-expression grounds and objected to the District Court’s refusal to admit an additional video posted by Levy.

The Court’s Holding

Justice Yechiel Kasher denied leave to appeal without requesting Levy’s response. Although the scope of section 3(a)(5A) had not been examined comprehensively in prior Supreme Court decisions, that alone did not justify a third-tier appeal: an issue is not sufficiently substantial merely because it is novel when its answer is clear. Most of Tenenbaum’s actionable publications did not reuse Levy’s content at all, and the four that did were humiliating and degrading both in their overall meaning and in Tenenbaum’s added commentary.

The Court held that Levy’s decision to publish photographs of her body and encourage women with similar bodies not to feel ashamed did not constitute consent—express or implied—to Tenenbaum’s offensive publications. Such self-publication gave him no “license” to evaluate her body, identify perceived defects, propose ways to alter it, or continue after she demanded that he stop. The text and context of his publications plainly amounted to sexual harassment, so no broader statutory interpretation was required.

The Court declined to revisit damages because the lower courts had considered the relevant circumstances, the award was several times lower than the available maximum statutory damages, and Levy had withdrawn her own appeal concerning the amount. The application was dismissed with no costs because no response had been requested. The Court also ordered publication of the decision without anonymizing the parties: the restrictions had originally protected Levy, she requested full publication, and Tenenbaum filed no position despite receiving additional time.

Key Takeaways

  • A person’s voluntary publication of body-related or sexualized content does not imply consent to another person’s humiliating or degrading commentary about that person’s body or sexuality.
  • Reusing a target’s own social-media material may still constitute sexual harassment when the republisher adds degrading sexual commentary or places the material in a humiliating context.
  • A statutory issue’s novelty does not by itself warrant a third-tier appeal when the answer follows clearly from the statute’s basic principles and the case’s facts.

Why It Matters

The decision draws a firm distinction between choosing how to present one’s own body online and consenting to others’ sexualized, degrading treatment of that material. Public self-expression does not surrender personal autonomy or authorize persistent harassment, especially after an unequivocal demand to stop.

The ruling also shows that Israeli courts may assess a course of online conduct as a whole—including direct messages, republished content, added commentary, persistence, and context—rather than treating each post as an isolated instance of mere rudeness or criticism.

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