Background
Richard Long pleaded guilty in 2015 to two counts of first-degree rape and one count of first-degree sodomy. He later sought post-conviction relief, alleging that trial counsel provided inadequate and ineffective assistance concerning Oregon’s then-valid rule permitting nonunanimous jury verdicts.
Long claimed that counsel should have advised him that the United States Supreme Court was likely to find the rule unconstitutional and should not have told him that a nonunanimous jury could convict him. The post-conviction court denied relief, finding that counsel accurately described the law as it stood in 2015 and that Long had not suffered prejudice.
The post-conviction court also found that the prosecution’s case was strong, the plea substantially reduced Long’s potential time in custody, and Long was not credible when he asserted that different advice about a possible future change in the law would have caused him to reject the plea and proceed to trial. On appeal, appointed counsel filed a Balfour brief containing no client-written Section B, and the state waived appearance.
The Court’s Holding
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment denying post-conviction relief. After independently reviewing the record, the post-conviction court file, the hearing transcripts, and the Balfour brief, the court found no arguably meritorious issue for appeal.
The court noted that it was bound by the post-conviction court’s credibility finding. It also relied on precedent establishing that counsel’s duty to exercise reasonable professional skill and judgment does not require predicting an about-face by the United States Supreme Court.
Key Takeaways
- Trial counsel was not constitutionally deficient for accurately advising Long about Oregon law as it existed in 2015.
- Counsel was not required to predict that the United States Supreme Court would later invalidate nonunanimous jury verdicts.
- The post-conviction court’s adverse credibility finding and its findings concerning the strong case and favorable plea defeated Long’s claim of prejudice.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces that ineffective-assistance claims generally cannot rest on counsel’s failure to anticipate a later major change in constitutional law. It also illustrates the importance of trial-level credibility findings when a petitioner claims that different legal advice would have changed the decision to plead guilty.
The opinion is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion under ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as that rule permits.