Background
Newton Scott Mulama, a Kenyan citizen, entered the United States on a student visa in 2007, earned an M.B.A., and remained after his visa expired. He later worked as a hospital controller in Michigan and fathered three U.S.-citizen children: a daughter diagnosed with autism and twin sons with whom he shared custody.
After immigration authorities charged Mulama as removable, he sought cancellation of removal or, alternatively, voluntary departure. An immigration judge found that his removal would cause primarily financial and emotional hardship but not the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” required for cancellation. The judge nevertheless granted voluntary departure, conditioned on a $500 bond. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the cancellation denial, denied Mulama’s motion to remand based on new evidence about his daughter, and declined to reinstate voluntary departure because it found no proof that he had posted the bond.
The Court’s Holding
The Sixth Circuit rejected Mulama’s due-process claim alleging executive-branch bias because he had not exhausted that claim before the immigration judge or the Board. It also upheld the denial of cancellation of removal, concluding that the Board applied the correct demanding hardship standard, considered the cumulative effect on all three children, and reasonably determined that the financial and emotional consequences did not rise to the statutorily required level.
The court further held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying remand for consideration of new evidence concerning Mulama’s daughter. Her autism diagnosis, custody arrangements, insurance coverage, and child-support payments were unlikely to change the hardship result because her mother remained her primary caregiver and she would continue receiving appropriate care and educational services.
On voluntary departure, the court did not decide whether it had jurisdiction to review the Board’s conclusion that Mulama failed to provide proof of the bond, or whether that conclusion was correct. Because the Attorney General requested a voluntary remand, the court granted the petition in part and remanded for the Board to reconsider Mulama’s eligibility for voluntary departure; it otherwise denied the petition.
Key Takeaways
- The “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” requirement demands hardship substantially beyond the ordinary financial and emotional consequences of removing a parent.
- An agency-bias due-process claim must be exhausted during the administrative removal proceedings when the government invokes the exhaustion requirement.
- New evidence supports remand only if it is material—meaning it would likely change the outcome—and largely cumulative evidence does not satisfy that standard.
- The voluntary-departure issue returns to the Board without a merits ruling because the Attorney General requested remand to reconsider whether Mulama qualified.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces the Sixth Circuit’s deferential review of the Board’s application of the cancellation-of-removal hardship standard. Even substantial parental involvement, financial support, separation-related emotional harm, and a child’s autism diagnosis may be insufficient when other caregivers can continue providing stable financial, medical, and educational support.
The opinion also distinguishes the affirmed removal-related rulings from the unresolved voluntary-departure question. Mulama did not obtain cancellation of removal, but he preserved an opportunity for the Board to reconsider whether the record established compliance with the voluntary-departure bond requirement.