Background
Goce Gligorov, a Slovenian businessman and former consultant to Brunei’s government, alleged that Bruneian officials hired him to investigate corruption but withheld his promised $250,000 payment after he reported evidence of theft, money laundering, and terrorism financing. He claimed that the officials then conspired to damage his reputation and business, including by prompting an INTERPOL Blue Notice.
Gligorov sued Brunei, government officials, and three corporate entities—Audley Property Management Company Limited, Seven Properties AG, and The Dorchester Group, LLC—asserting civil RICO, conspiracy, tort, and contract-related claims. Only the corporate defendants were properly served and appeared. The district court dismissed them for lack of personal jurisdiction, denied jurisdictional discovery, and entered partial final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
The Court’s Holding
The D.C. Circuit affirmed. RICO’s jurisdictional provision did not apply because Gligorov had not established personal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) over any defendant. Although he relied on Brunei’s presence in the District of Columbia, he had not served Brunei as required by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and identified no other defendant subject to jurisdiction under Section 1965(a).
Rule 4(k)(2) also did not support jurisdiction. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, the court assumed without deciding—based on the parties’ agreement—that Fifth Amendment due process required a meaningful U.S. nexus and a reasonable exercise of jurisdiction. That standard was unmet because Gligorov had little demonstrated interest in a U.S. forum, the dispute implicated no meaningful U.S. sovereign interest, and litigation here would burden foreign defendants with scant relevant U.S. connections. The Dorchester Group’s California hotels and the alleged Beverly Hills meeting did not make jurisdiction reasonable under the circumstances.
The district court also acted within its discretion by denying jurisdictional discovery. Gligorov did not show a good-faith basis to believe the requested information would establish reasonable jurisdiction, and his broad requests amounted to an impermissible fishing expedition disconnected from facts that could alter the jurisdictional analysis.
Key Takeaways
- RICO’s nationwide service mechanism requires personal jurisdiction over at least one defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a); an unserved foreign sovereign cannot supply that foundation.
- The court assumed without deciding that Fifth Amendment jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) requires a meaningful U.S. nexus and reasonableness, leaving the governing post-Fuld standard unresolved beyond this appeal.
- A defendant’s general U.S. business presence and thin allegations of one domestic meeting were insufficient where the parties, alleged injuries, and underlying dispute were overwhelmingly foreign.
- Jurisdictional discovery requires a factual basis for believing discovery will produce information affecting jurisdiction, not conjecture or broad requests for possible U.S. contacts.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates that Fuld’s rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment minimum-contacts test in federal Fifth Amendment cases does not automatically open federal courts to disputes involving foreign defendants. At least under the reasonableness framework assumed here, courts may examine the plaintiff’s interest in a U.S. forum, the United States’ sovereign interest, and the burden on each defendant.
The opinion also highlights the distinction between congressionally enacted jurisdictional statutes and Rule 4(k)(2), a court-promulgated procedural rule that does not itself express a substantive federal policy favoring jurisdiction over particular foreign defendants.