Background
Lawrence Hudson submitted three public-records requests to Maricopa County seeking cast vote records (CVRs) generated after the March 2024 presidential preference election, July 2024 primary election, and November 2024 general election. A CVR is an electronic record of ballot selections and may include ballot-identification information and ballot images. The County did not provide the requested CVRs, concluding they were not public records subject to disclosure.
Hudson filed a special action under Arizona’s public-records law. He conceded that CVRs were data derived from cast ballots and included ballot numbers, but argued they did not identify voters and could be released once the elections were final. The superior court granted the County judgment on the pleadings, holding that A.R.S. § 16-625 exempted the records from disclosure.
The Court’s Holding
The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that CVRs are “electronic data from” ballots within the meaning of A.R.S. § 16-625. Because election officials scan ballots into an electronic voting system, which electronically records and retains information reflecting voters’ ballot markings, the resulting CVRs fall within the statute’s protection for electronic ballot data.
The court also rejected Hudson’s argument that the statute applies only during active elections. Read with A.R.S. § 16-624, which requires post-canvass ballot security and retention, § 16-625 protects electronic ballot data beyond the canvass. The statute’s specific nondisclosure protection supersedes the general presumption favoring public-records disclosure. The court further held that the superior court properly considered the County’s Rule 12(c) motion without converting it to summary judgment because the attached government publications were judicially noticeable public records.
Key Takeaways
- Cast vote records are electronic data derived from ballots under A.R.S. § 16-625.
- Section 16-625 bars disclosure of CVRs through Arizona public-records requests.
- Ballot-data protections continue after an election has been canvassed.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms that Arizona’s ballot-security statutes limit public access to electronic records generated from voted ballots, even where a requester contends the records do not reveal voter identities. It extends the reasoning applied to ballot images to CVRs and reinforces that a specific election-record confidentiality restriction controls over the general public-records law.