Background
Ronald Levart Hill was charged under the former version of Michigan’s ethnic-intimidation statute after an alleged altercation with a rideshare driver. The driver alleged that Hill threatened to harm her because of her race or ethnicity, prompting her to stop at a gas station and hide in a bathroom until police arrived.
Before trial, the parties and the Oakland Circuit Court agreed that the model jury instruction did not accurately state every element of the offense. The trial court ultimately adopted a modified instruction requiring proof that Hill recklessly made a threat, but it removed language requiring “reasonable cause to believe” the threatened physical contact would occur. The prosecutor obtained leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals held that the proposed instruction improperly reduced the prosecution’s burden. Under the statute applicable to Hill’s alleged conduct, the prosecution must prove that he maliciously threatened the complainant. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Counterman v. Colorado, which requires at least recklessness before true threats may be criminalized, establishes a constitutional floor and does not replace Michigan’s more demanding statutory malice requirement.
The court also held that the instruction must include the statutory requirement that there was reasonable cause to believe the threatened act would occur. Removing that language omitted an element of the offense. The court explained that this objective component is consistent with Counterman and helps ensure that the charged speech qualifies as a constitutionally unprotected true threat.
The court suggested, without requiring, an instruction combining malice, reasonable cause, lack of justification or excuse, and the specific intent to intimidate or harass because of the complainant’s protected characteristic. It reversed the trial court’s order to the extent inconsistent with its opinion and remanded for further proceedings.
Key Takeaways
- An instruction under former MCL 750.147b(1)(c) must require proof that the defendant maliciously made the threat; recklessness alone does not satisfy the statute.
- The prosecution must prove there was reasonable cause to believe the threatened physical contact or property-related act would occur.
- Counterman sets the minimum mens rea constitutionally required for prosecuting true threats but does not displace a statute’s more demanding mental-state requirement.
Why It Matters
The decision clarifies how Michigan trial courts must instruct juries in prosecutions arising under the former ethnic-intimidation statute. Courts must preserve both the statute’s subjective malice requirement and its objective reasonable-cause element.
The opinion also illustrates that First Amendment true-threat doctrine supplies constitutional minimum protections while leaving legislatures free to require prosecutors to prove a higher level of culpability.