Background
Eddie Stewart, an African American driver at GES Recycling’s South Carolina plant, alleged that he experienced repeated racial harassment and discrimination during his approximately four months of employment. On June 13, 2017, Stewart complained to manager Adam Gordon about racial slurs, offensive conduct, and the denial of crane-operator training. Gordon suspended him that day, and GES terminated him eight days later.
Stewart sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for a hostile work environment, discrimination in training and promotion, and retaliatory discharge. The district court granted GES summary judgment on all three claims. Stewart appealed only the retaliatory-discharge ruling, arguing that factual disputes existed over whether GES’s stated reason for firing him—“belligerent and insubordinate conduct”—was a pretext for retaliation.
The Court’s Holding
In a 2-1 published decision, the Fourth Circuit vacated summary judgment on the retaliatory-discharge claim and remanded. Viewing the evidence in Stewart’s favor, the majority held that a jury could dispute whether the threatening or intimidating conduct alleged by GES actually occurred. Stewart’s account described profanity and perhaps a raised voice, but did not establish as undisputed the more serious conduct on which GES relied.
The court also found a genuine factual dispute over whether GES’s explanation changed over time. A jury could interpret the statement made to Stewart at termination—that he was fired for “the way” he spoke to Gordon—as referring solely to profanity, which Stewart said was commonplace at the plant, while GES later characterized his behavior as threatening, belligerent, and insubordinate. Those disputes could support a finding of pretext and permit a jury to conclude that retaliation was a but-for cause of the termination.
Key Takeaways
- An employer’s disputed account of alleged misconduct cannot be treated as established fact at summary judgment when the employee supplies a materially different account.
- Evidence that an employer gave different explanations for a termination can support a finding that its asserted nonretaliatory reason was pretextual.
- The court did not consider Stewart’s newly raised “cat’s paw” theory because he had not presented it to the district court.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces that courts assessing pretext must view both the historical facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving employee. Close timing between protected complaints and termination, combined with disputes about the misconduct and the consistency of the employer’s explanation, may allow a Section 1981 retaliation claim to reach a jury.
Judge Quattlebaum dissented, reasoning that Stewart’s admitted conduct supported GES’s stated justification and that describing “the way” Stewart spoke as “belligerent and insubordinate” merely elaborated on, rather than changed, the company’s original explanation.