Background
Dror Ben Natan appealed Registrar M. Yahav’s July 1, 2026 decision in המנ”א 23921-06-26 denying his request for additional time to seek a further hearing on a Supreme Court judgment issued on May 19, 2026 in Civil Appeals 2175/23 and 2262/23.
Under Regulation 4 of Israel’s Further Hearing Procedure Regulations, 5744-1984, a petition for a further hearing must be filed within 15 days after the judgment is rendered, not after it is served or first viewed. Ben Natan attributed the delay to a change of counsel and current counsel’s good-faith belief that the period began when he viewed the judgment on May 25, 2026 rather than when the Court issued it on May 19.
Ben Natan also relied on his counsel’s personal and family circumstances and alleged technical difficulties with the Net HaMishpat electronic court system. The registrar found that these matters did not constitute a special reason for extending the deadline, particularly because neither Ben Natan nor anyone acting for him had filed even a brief extension request during the statutory period.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Alex Stein dismissed the appeal. He emphasized that Supreme Court registrars have broad discretion when deciding requests to extend procedural deadlines and that appellate review of such rulings is extremely limited, with intervention reserved for exceptional cases. This case did not qualify.
The Court held that a litigant’s or lawyer’s mistake in interpreting the law or calculating a filing period is not a “special reason” warranting an extension. Responsibility for determining the governing procedural rules and deadlines rests with the litigant. Although counsel’s personal and family circumstances warranted empathy, they and the alleged technical problems did not explain the failure to submit a timely request for more time.
The registrar had also properly balanced the respondents’ reliance interest in litigation pending since 2018 and reasonably concluded that the proposed further-hearing petition did not appear likely to succeed under the narrow standards governing that extraordinary procedure. The appeal was therefore dismissed without costs because no response had been requested.
Key Takeaways
- The 15-day period for petitioning the Supreme Court of Israel for a further hearing runs from the date the judgment is rendered, not from service or actual viewing.
- A good-faith legal or calendaring error by a party or counsel ordinarily does not constitute the special reason required for an extension.
- Appellate intervention in a registrar’s deadline-extension ruling is reserved for exceptional cases, and the apparent merits of the proposed further-hearing petition may weigh against an extension.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores the strict treatment of deadlines for seeking a further hearing in Israel’s Supreme Court. Counsel cannot rely on the date of electronic notice or actual access to the judgment and should file at least a short protective extension request within the prescribed period if timely completion is in doubt.
It also confirms that personal hardship and technical difficulties must specifically explain why no timely filing was possible. Courts may weigh those circumstances against finality and the opposing parties’ reliance interests, especially in long-running litigation.