Background
Robert Lee Simons was convicted by a jury of first-degree and second-degree criminal sexual conduct based on allegations that he sexually abused his stepdaughter, NN, beginning when she was a young child. NN testified that the abuse continued until she was about 14. Simons testified in his own defense and denied the allegations. The jury found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to 25 to 50 years for CSC-I and 5 to 15 years for CSC-II.
At trial, prosecution expert Thomas Cottrell testified about his decades of work with child sexual-abuse victims. In response to juror questions, he said that only a “handful” of the roughly 300 to 350 children with whom he had worked had fabricated abuse and that false allegations represented a “very small percentage.” Simons did not contemporaneously object but later argued in a motion for a new trial that this testimony impermissibly vouched for NN. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that Cottrell had discussed child-abuse allegations generally rather than NN’s credibility specifically.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that Cottrell’s testimony constituted impermissible vouching. Although he did not assign a precise numerical percentage to false allegations, his statements quantified their rarity and conveyed essentially the same message: children reporting sexual abuse overwhelmingly tell the truth. The court explained that an expert who comments on the general truthfulness of child sexual-abuse complainants inferentially vouches for the particular complainant.
Reviewing the unpreserved claim for plain error, the court found the error clear under longstanding Michigan precedent and concluded that it affected Simons’s substantial rights. The trial was a direct credibility contest without physical evidence, eyewitnesses to the assaults, or inculpatory statements, and the jury itself had elicited the challenged testimony. Because the expert’s vouching likely influenced the verdict and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings, the court vacated both convictions and remanded for a new trial. It did not address Simons’s remaining appellate arguments.
Key Takeaways
- An expert may not testify that children rarely fabricate sexual-abuse allegations, even without stating a precise percentage.
- General testimony about the statistical rarity of false reports can impermissibly vouch for the specific complainant’s credibility.
- Unpreserved vouching may warrant reversal when the case turns primarily on whether the jury believes the complainant or the defendant.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces strict limits on expert testimony in child sexual-abuse prosecutions. Experts may explain relevant behavioral patterns within the boundaries permitted by Michigan law, but they may not give jurors a statistical or experience-based reason to presume that a complainant is truthful.
It also illustrates that juror-submitted questions remain subject to evidentiary restrictions. A trial court must screen those questions carefully, particularly when an expert’s answer could effectively resolve the central credibility dispute.