Background
Robert Lee Simons was convicted by a jury of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct based on allegations that he sexually abused his stepdaughter, NN, beginning when she was a young child. Simons denied the allegations. The trial produced no physical evidence, eyewitness testimony, or inculpatory statements, making the case principally a credibility contest between Simons and NN.
Thomas Cottrell, an expert with decades of experience working with child sexual-abuse victims, testified for the prosecution. In response to juror questions, he said that only a handful of the roughly 300 to 350 children with whom he had worked had fabricated abuse and that false reports represented a “very small percentage.” Simons did not object at trial but later challenged the testimony in a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that Cottrell’s testimony impermissibly vouched for NN’s credibility. Although he did not provide a precise numerical percentage, his statements quantified the rarity of fabricated child-sexual-abuse allegations and conveyed essentially the same information that Michigan precedent bars experts from presenting. An expert who opines that child complainants generally tell the truth inferentially vouches for the particular complainant.
Reviewing the unpreserved issue for plain error, the court found that the error was clear, affected the outcome, and seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Because the trial turned on credibility and the jurors themselves elicited the vouching testimony, the improperly admitted evidence likely influenced their verdict. The court vacated both convictions and remanded for a new trial without addressing Simons’s remaining appellate arguments.
Key Takeaways
- An expert may not testify that children rarely fabricate sexual-abuse allegations, even without stating a precise percentage.
- General testimony about the low frequency of false reports can improperly vouch for the particular complainant’s credibility.
- In a close credibility contest, such testimony can constitute outcome-determinative plain error requiring a new trial.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces Michigan’s strict limits on expert testimony in child-sexual-abuse prosecutions. Experts may explain recognized victim behaviors in appropriate circumstances, but they may not supply statistical or experience-based assurances that complainants generally tell the truth.
It also shows that an unpreserved evidentiary error may warrant reversal when credibility is decisive and improper expert testimony gives jurors an ostensibly objective basis for believing the complainant.