Background
Following a bench trial, James Aaron Haburn was convicted of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Police found the firearm on Haburn after stopping a vehicle in which he was a passenger and frisking him.
Haburn moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that officers unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop and lacked reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. He also challenged the calculation of his advisory sentencing range, contending that the government had not established the intent to kill necessary to apply the attempted-murder guideline cross-reference in U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1.
The Court’s Holding
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Haburn’s suppression motion. It found no reversible error in the district court’s determinations that the officers did not unlawfully extend the stop and that, even if they had, reasonable suspicion supported further investigation. The court also upheld the frisk based on the totality of the circumstances: the vehicle matched the description of one recently involved in a shooting, officers found a bullet on its floorboard, and they knew Haburn had a prior violent-felony conviction.
The court also affirmed application of the attempted-murder cross-reference. The district court did not clearly err in finding the required intent to kill because Haburn shot an individual in the back from a moving vehicle after fighting with that person earlier in the evening.
Key Takeaways
- Officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity involving the vehicle, independently supporting the continued investigation even if the traffic stop had been extended.
- The vehicle’s connection to a recent shooting, the bullet on its floorboard, and Haburn’s known violent-felony history collectively supported reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous.
- Shooting a person in the back from a moving vehicle after an earlier fight supported the finding of intent to kill required for the attempted-murder guideline cross-reference.
Why It Matters
The unpublished decision illustrates how multiple circumstances may combine to justify a protective frisk during a traffic stop, even when no single circumstance necessarily would suffice alone. It also shows that a sentencing court may infer intent to kill from the manner of a shooting and the events preceding it, with that factual determination reviewed for clear error.