Background
Peter Hommerson was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for the 1996 shooting deaths of Marvin and Kay Lichtman. The prosecution presented circumstantial evidence that Hommerson had access to the Lichtmans’ home, rented a van and bought boxes on the day of the murders, purchased seven gallons of gasoline shortly before a gasoline-fueled fire was reported at the home, made inconsistent statements about his activities, possessed a Lichtman vase in his work van, and fled to Mexico after police questioned him. Investigators also found evidence that he had owned a .22-caliber Ruger handgun and ammunition consistent with shell casings recovered at the crime scene.
In postconviction proceedings, Hommerson claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present ballistics evidence involving casings recovered from his Wisconsin property and for failing to call former business partners Frank Marcus “Mark” Lemp and Peter Hall. He argued that the ballistics evidence showed his Ruger was not the murder weapon and that Lemp and Hall would have undermined the prosecution’s theory that financial problems supplied a motive. Following a third-stage evidentiary hearing, the Lake County circuit court denied the petition.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court affirmed. It held that counsel was not ineffective for omitting the Wisconsin ballistics evidence because the evidence did not exonerate Hommerson or create a reasonable probability of a different verdict. The Wisconsin casings were not fired by the weapon associated with the crime-scene evidence, but that fact did not establish that those casings came from Hommerson’s Ruger or that he lacked access to another .22-caliber firearm. At most, the evidence could suggest that he owned multiple .22-caliber weapons.
The court also held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate or call Lemp and Hall. The jury already heard testimony that Hommerson and his wife had a six-figure income, substantial property, investments, and little debt, and defense counsel used that evidence to argue that Hommerson lacked a financial motive. Further testimony about a business that had closed years earlier was unlikely to affect the verdict, and Lemp’s assistance in Hommerson’s flight could have diminished his credibility or produced harmful cross-examination. Because the court found no individual error, it rejected Hommerson’s cumulative-error argument as well.
Key Takeaways
- Ballistics evidence showing that casings from Hommerson’s Wisconsin property did not match the crime-scene evidence did not establish that his Ruger was not the murder weapon or otherwise prove his innocence.
- Counsel’s failure to call witnesses about Hommerson’s former business did not establish ineffective assistance because the defense had already presented substantial evidence disputing financial motive, and the omitted testimony was unlikely to change the verdict.
- The substantial circumstantial evidence of guilt—including Hommerson’s inconsistent accounts, gasoline purchase, possession of the victims’ property, firearm-related evidence, and flight to Mexico—prevented him from showing Strickland prejudice.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the demanding burden on a defendant seeking relief after a third-stage postconviction hearing. Omitted evidence must do more than offer another favorable inference; it must show both objectively unreasonable representation and a reasonable probability that the trial result would have been different.
The order also underscores that counsel may reasonably decline testimony that is cumulative, only loosely connected to the prosecution’s motive theory, or vulnerable to damaging cross-examination. The order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is nonprecedential except in the limited circumstances permitted by Rule 23(e)(1).