Background
On January 20, 2023, Ahmad’s vehicle was recorded traveling at 137 km/h on a road with an 80 km/h speed limit. Police mailed notice of the alleged offense to her registered address, but it was returned as “unclaimed.” A summons and traffic indictment sent to the same address in April 2024 were also returned unclaimed. Ahmad failed to appear at the June 18, 2024 hearing, was convicted in absentia of violating Regulation 54(a) of the Traffic Regulations, and received, among other penalties, a ₪2,000 fine and a one-month license suspension.
In May 2025, Ahmad sought to vacate the judgment, claiming that she had learned of the conviction only a week earlier and had meritorious defenses. The Traffic Court denied relief because service was presumed valid, her defenses and claimed discovery date were unsupported, and her application was delayed. In May 2026, she asserted for the first time that her son had been driving. The Traffic Court denied her request for additional time to seek reconsideration, and the District Court summarily dismissed her appeal, including on grounds of delay.
Ahmad then petitioned the Supreme Court for a new trial under sections 31(a)(2) and 31(a)(4) of the Courts Law. She submitted her son’s affidavit admitting that he drove, an insurance certificate purportedly showing that he was the vehicle’s only authorized driver, and a letter enclosing photographs of the offense and stating that no video existed. She argued that this evidence could change the result and that convicting her without determining who actually drove created a real risk of a miscarriage of justice.
The Court’s Holding
Deputy President Noam Sohlberg denied the application. The Court reiterated that new trials are reserved for rare and exceptional cases and that purportedly new evidence must be capable of changing the outcome and must be “new in the substantive sense”—meaning that the applicant could not have presented it in the earlier proceedings. The son’s affidavit had already appeared in some prior proceedings, while Ahmad offered no supported explanation for failing to submit the other materials earlier. Those materials were apparently accessible to her, or obtainable from the relevant entities, from the outset.
The Court also rejected the miscarriage-of-justice claim. That ground does not provide another appeal but addresses a substantial concern that serious procedural defects caused a wrongful conviction. Because the summons was sent to Ahmad’s undisputed residential address and returned unclaimed, the statutory presumption of service under Regulation 44A of the Criminal Procedure Regulations applied.
Ahmad’s general denial and contention that no genuine inquiry had determined the driver’s identity did not establish special circumstances or show that she failed to receive the notice for reasons beyond her control rather than because she avoided accepting it. The Court therefore found no serious procedural defect and no basis for a new trial.
Key Takeaways
- Evidence omitted from the original case is not substantively “new” unless the applicant shows that it could not have been presented earlier.
- Mail sent to an undisputed registered address and returned unclaimed may trigger the statutory presumption of valid service in traffic proceedings.
- A new-trial application is not an additional appeal; a miscarriage-of-justice claim requires a real concern that serious procedural defects produced a wrongful conviction.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores the demanding threshold for reopening even an in absentia traffic conviction. A later identification of another driver will not by itself justify a new trial when the supporting evidence was previously available and the defendant fails to explain why it was not timely produced.
It also confirms that defendants cannot overcome presumed service merely by asserting that they lacked actual knowledge. They must show that nonreceipt resulted from circumstances beyond their control and not from failure to claim properly addressed mail.