Background
A jury convicted Brandon Robinson in 2011 of first-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony for the shooting death of Cameron Johnson. Jarren Glandton, who was also shot but survived, testified that Robinson was the shooter. The State also introduced Glandton’s pretrial identifications of Robinson, including his identification of Robinson in a photographic array. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal, and Robinson’s first motion for postconviction relief was unsuccessful.
In 2025, Robinson filed a second postconviction motion based on what he characterized as new evidence of actual innocence. He relied on an affidavit from Tymere Nickerson describing an encounter with Robinson at an unspecified time on the day of the shooting and on an interview in which Glandton reportedly first told Detective Pfaff that he did not know who shot him before identifying Robinson. The Superior Court held that neither item was new, sufficiently persuasive evidence creating a strong inference of actual innocence and denied the motion.
The Court’s Holding
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Robinson had not satisfied the actual-innocence exception to the procedural bars governing successive postconviction motions. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(2)(i), a movant must plead with particularity that new evidence creates a strong inference that the movant is factually innocent. Qualifying evidence must be new, sufficiently persuasive, and more than merely cumulative or impeaching.
The court did not decide whether Nickerson’s affidavit was new because it was not sufficiently persuasive. The affidavit provided no definite time or meaningful location information and did not establish that Robinson was absent from the murder scene. Glandton’s interview was not new because Robinson acknowledged knowing about it before trial, and it was not sufficiently persuasive because it largely duplicated evidence the jury had already heard: Glandton initially disclaimed knowing who fired the shots but then identified Robinson. The court was not convinced that either item, considered with the full record, would probably change the result at a new trial.
Key Takeaways
- A successive Delaware postconviction motion based on actual innocence requires new and sufficiently persuasive evidence that creates a strong inference of factual innocence.
- An affidavit that does not establish when or where the defendant was at the time of the crime is insufficient to support an alibi or probably change the trial result.
- Evidence known to the defendant before trial is not new, and cumulative impeachment evidence ordinarily will not overcome Rule 61’s procedural bars.
Why It Matters
The order reinforces the demanding standard Delaware applies to actual-innocence claims in successive postconviction proceedings. A defendant cannot avoid procedural bars merely by presenting additional impeachment material or an imprecise potential alibi; the evidence must have been unavailable despite due diligence and must be powerful enough, in the context of the entire record, probably to change the verdict.