Levy v. Israel Discount Bank — Supreme Court denies third-tier review of refusal to halt foreclosure

Case
Yael Levy v. Israel Discount Bank Ltd.
Court
Supreme Court of Israel (Israel)
Judge
גילה כנפי-שטייניץ (Judicial Selection Committee, chaired by Justice Minister Gideon Sa'ar, 2022)
Date Decided
August 24, 2026
Citation
LCA 64647-07-26
Topics
Mortgage Enforcement; Interim Injunctions; Third-Tier Review; Abuse of Process

Background

Yael Levy borrowed money from Israel Discount Bank in 2019, secured by a mortgage over a residential property in Ramat Gan. After the loan remained unpaid despite extensions, the bank began enforcement proceedings. While represented by counsel, Levy signed a June 2025 undertaking acknowledging a debt of approximately NIS 1.1 million, agreeing to repay it in installments, consenting to rejection of her “paid” defense, and permitting eviction and realization of the property if she defaulted.

Levy later filed a first action seeking to invalidate the loan and mortgage arrangements, or alternatively to repay only the principal, and to stay enforcement. In February 2026, the parties entered a court-approved procedural arrangement providing for mediation and, if mediation failed, payment of the outstanding balance “under protest”; otherwise, eviction would proceed. After mediation failed, the payment deadline was extended to July 15, 2026.

While the first action remained pending, Levy filed a second action seeking overlapping relief, including invalidation of the undertaking and the procedural arrangement, together with another ex parte request to halt enforcement. The Magistrates’ Court declined to grant an ex parte injunction, and the District Court denied leave to appeal. Levy then sought third-tier leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

The Court’s Holding

Justice Gila Canfy-Steinitz denied leave to appeal. Third-tier review is available only sparingly, where a case presents a general question extending beyond the parties or denial would cause a miscarriage of justice. That standard applies with particular force to a second request for leave concerning an interlocutory ruling on interim relief. The lower-court decisions were confined to the case’s specific circumstances, and the Court found no risk of a miscarriage of justice.

The Court also identified serious preliminary difficulties with Levy’s second action and renewed injunction request. The relief substantially overlapped with the still-pending first action, including the requested invalidation of the undertaking. Filing a new action could not serve as an indirect route to challenge rulings made in the first action, and the Court said the conduct bordered on abuse of process.

On the interim-relief factors, the claims did not appear likely to succeed because Levy had acknowledged the debt and agreed twice to repayment arrangements, yet supplied no prima facie factual or legal foundation for invalidating them. The balance of convenience also did not support intervention: she had agreed that the property could be realized upon nonpayment, and the record indicated that she owned two additional apartments. The Court therefore dismissed the application, awarded the bank NIS 2,500 in costs, and vacated its earlier temporary order delaying eviction, which in any event had been conditioned on a NIS 50,000 deposit that Levy did not make.

Key Takeaways

  • Third-tier review of an interlocutory decision denying temporary relief is reserved for exceptional cases presenting a broader legal question or a risk of miscarriage of justice.
  • A litigant generally cannot open a substantially overlapping second action to obtain interim relief previously denied in an existing action; doing so may border on abuse of process.
  • The phrase “eviction from a residence” does not automatically determine the balance of convenience; courts assess the parties’ agreements and the claimant’s actual housing circumstances.

Why It Matters

The decision illustrates the exceptionally high threshold for Supreme Court intervention in successive appeals concerning temporary injunctions, particularly when parallel proceedings seek overlapping relief. It also shows that alleged residential displacement, though significant, must be evaluated in context rather than treated as automatically decisive.

The ruling was preliminary and procedural. The Supreme Court assessed only whether third-tier review and interim relief were warranted; it did not finally adjudicate the validity of the undertaking, the court-approved procedural arrangement, or the underlying loan and mortgage agreements.

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