United States v. Thompson — Eleventh Circuit affirmed convictions arising from computer hacking, child sexual abuse material, firearm possession, and registration violations

Case
United States of America v. Samuel Arthur Thompson
Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Judge
Rosenbaum; Branch; Grant
Date Decided
August 24, 2026
Docket No.
24-11009
Topics
Right to Counsel; Child-Witness Testimony; Criminal Discovery; Search Warrants
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Samuel Arthur Thompson formerly worked as a control-room engineer for the Jacksonville Jaguars. After the team ended its relationship with him, its stadium videoboards malfunctioned during several games. Investigators traced unauthorized remote access to Thompson, obtained a warrant to search his home, and seized electronic devices. The devices contained evidence of the computer intrusions as well as child sexual abuse material, including material Thompson appeared to have produced.

A second superseding indictment charged Thompson with ten offenses involving child-pornography possession, receipt, and production; causing damage to protected computers; sex-offender travel-reporting violations; and firearm possession by a convicted felon. Thompson represented himself with standby counsel and was convicted on every count after a nine-day trial. The district court sentenced him to 2,640 months in prison followed by lifetime supervised release.

The Court’s Holding

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Thompson knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived counsel. His original Faretta waiver remained valid after new charges increased his sentencing exposure because the government explained each charge and its penalties at arraignment, Thompson confirmed his understanding, and he repeatedly reaffirmed his desire to proceed pro se. The Constitution did not require a mechanically repeated Faretta hearing.

The district court also properly denied Thompson’s discovery and continuance motions. The government gave him ample supervised access to the electronic evidence and supplied copies when legally permitted, while 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m) barred it from relinquishing control of material containing child pornography. Thompson failed to identify specific substantial prejudice from the denied continuance, and the record supported the finding that his own litigation choices caused the preparation delays.

Allowing one child victim to testify through two-way closed-circuit television did not violate the Confrontation Clause because individualized findings showed that Thompson’s presence would cause paralyzing anxiety impairing the child’s ability to communicate, while the child testified under oath, was cross-examined, and remained visible to Thompson, the jury, and the court. Nor was Thompson’s self-representation right plainly violated: he watched contemporaneously and directed standby counsel’s questioning. Finally, the district court properly rejected his subpoena and suppression arguments because his proposed witnesses were not shown to be necessary for a Franks hearing, the warrant affidavit established probable cause, and the finding that agents supplied the incorporated warrant attachments was not clearly erroneous.

Key Takeaways

  • A superseding indictment that adds charges or increases sentencing exposure does not automatically require a new Faretta hearing when the record shows that the defendant understands the new risks and continues to choose self-representation.
  • Supervised access at a government facility can make alleged child-pornography evidence reasonably available under 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m); defendants are not entitled to unsupervised copies or their preferred forensic format.
  • A child witness may testify by two-way closed-circuit television when case-specific evidence shows that the defendant’s presence would materially impair the child’s ability to communicate and the remaining safeguards of confrontation are preserved.

Why It Matters

The decision rejects rigid procedural rules for renewing a waiver of counsel after superseding charges and emphasizes that the constitutional inquiry focuses on the defendant’s actual understanding. It also explains how courts may reconcile a pro se defendant’s trial rights with statutory controls on child-pornography evidence and protections for vulnerable child witnesses.

For search-warrant litigation, the opinion reinforces that Rule 17(b) subpoenas cannot be used as exploratory discovery for a possible Franks claim and that probable cause rests on practical, common-sense probabilities, including reasonably inferred costs from responding to a computer intrusion.

✉️ Get tomorrow’s cases before your first coffee
Daily Case Law is our free morning digest — the most substantive new decisions, filtered to your jurisdictions and topics, each linking back here for the full analysis.

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Scroll to Top