Background
Jordan and Lauren Spallone, a married couple both employed as sergeants by the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP), filed Whistleblower Law claims in the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas. Mr. Spallone alleged that in 2020, a superior officer directed him to drop charges against individuals and to have another officer alter investigative findings. After he reported the misconduct to higher-level PSP officials, both he and his wife were subjected to retaliation—including an internal affairs investigation, attempted transfers, and denial of promotions. They sought money damages exceeding $30,000 each, along with restoration of promotions, pay, and employment status.
PSP filed preliminary objections arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Whistleblower Law claims against Commonwealth agencies fall within the Commonwealth Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction under Section 761(a)(1) of the Judicial Code. The trial court agreed, sustained the preliminary objections, and ordered transfer to the Commonwealth Court. The Spallones then sought and obtained certification for an interlocutory appeal to the Commonwealth Court, which granted permission and consolidated the cases for en banc review.
The central question was whether Whistleblower Law claims seeking money damages against a state agency fall within the Section 761(a)(1)(v) exception for actions “in the nature of trespass”—which would place them in the courts of common pleas—or whether they remain within the Commonwealth Court’s general original jurisdiction over all civil actions against the Commonwealth.
The Court’s Holding
Writing for the en banc panel, Judge Fizzano Cannon affirmed the trial court’s orders and held that Whistleblower Law claims against Commonwealth agencies belong in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction. The Court distinguished the Whistleblower Law from the tort-oriented statutory schemes—such as Section 1983 claims and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA)—that courts have previously held fall within the Section 761(a)(1)(v) exception. Relying on the Supreme Court’s characterization in O’Rourke v. Department of Corrections, 778 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 2001), the Court emphasized that the Whistleblower Law is primarily a “remedial measure intended to enhance openness in government” by protecting employees who report wrongdoing, not a tort-like statute designed to compensate for personal constitutional injuries.
The Court found several distinguishing characteristics. Unlike PHRA and Section 1983 claims, which are grounded in personal constitutional rights and are amenable to tort-style duty-breach analysis, Whistleblower Law claims protect at-will employment relationships in the public interest. Whistleblower Law claims are not tried before juries. And unlike the PHRA, which expressly directs claims to courts of common pleas, the Whistleblower Law refers only to “a court of competent jurisdiction,” which the Court construed as including either trial courts (for claims against local entities) or the Commonwealth Court (for claims against state entities), depending on the defendant.
Key Takeaways
- Whistleblower Law claims against the Commonwealth or its agencies must be filed in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, not in courts of common pleas. This is now established en banc precedent.
- The Section 761(a)(1)(v) exception for actions “in the nature of trespass” does not apply to Whistleblower Law claims because they are remedial in nature rather than analogous to tort liability.
- The Whistleblower Law’s reference to “a court of competent jurisdiction” is construed by reference to the Judicial Code: trial courts for claims against local entities, Commonwealth Court for claims against state agencies.
- Practitioners must carefully distinguish between Whistleblower Law claims and PHRA or Section 1983 claims when selecting a forum—filing in the wrong court risks dismissal or transfer and lost time.
Why It Matters
This en banc decision resolves an open question that had been addressed only in unpublished opinions. Until now, no published decision expressly held that Whistleblower Law claims against state entities must be brought in the Commonwealth Court, even though that had been the consistent practice. By issuing this ruling en banc with a seven-judge panel, the Court has created binding precedent that eliminates forum-selection uncertainty for state-employee whistleblowers and their counsel.
The practical impact is substantial. Plaintiffs’ attorneys representing state employees who allege retaliation for reporting governmental wrongdoing must file in the Commonwealth Court, which does not use juries for such claims. This changes litigation strategy, discovery practice, and trial preparation. Defense counsel for Commonwealth agencies, in turn, gain the certainty of a single forum and a bench-trial posture. The decision also reinforces the doctrinal distinction between the Whistleblower Law’s remedial purpose and the tort-like nature of PHRA and civil rights claims—a distinction that may carry implications for damages calculations, burden-of-proof arguments, and other substantive issues in future whistleblower litigation.