In re Parentage of A.U.-A. — Reversed denial of substitution and vacated later parenting orders

Case
In re Parentage of A.U.-A., a Minor (Ryann U., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Skye A., Respondent-Appellee)
Court
Illinois Appellate Court, First District, Third Division
Judge
Justice Reyes; Presiding Justice Martin; Justice Rochford
Date Decided
August 26, 2026
Docket No.
1-25-1787
Topics
Parentage; Substitution of Judge; Parenting Time; Civil Procedure
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Ryann U. and Skye A. disputed parental responsibilities and parenting time for their daughter, A.U.-A. Before trial, Ryann sought a continuance and appointment of an evaluator under section 604.10(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. On January 13, 2025, the circuit court denied the motion as an emergency because the matter did not satisfy the governing definition of an emergency. The court later established a briefing schedule for consideration of the requested relief as a non-emergency matter.

Ryann subsequently moved for substitution of judge as of right under section 2-1001(a)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The circuit court denied that motion, reasoning that its handling of the emergency motion constituted a ruling on a substantial issue. The case proceeded to trial, after which the court entered a final allocation judgment addressing parenting time and decision-making responsibilities. Ryann appealed both the substitution ruling and the exclusion of witnesses she had disclosed shortly before trial.

The Court’s Holding

The appellate court held that Ryann was entitled to substitution of judge as of right because she filed her motion before trial or a merits hearing began and before the assigned judge had ruled on any substantial issue. The January 13 order determined only that the earlier motion did not qualify for emergency treatment; the record did not establish that the court had decided the request for an evaluator on its merits.

Because a substantial ruling must relate directly to the merits, the emergency determination did not bar substitution. Once the statutory requirements were satisfied, the right to substitution was absolute and the circuit court had no discretion to deny it. The appellate court reversed the denial, vacated every order entered after the substitution motion was filed, and remanded with instructions to assign the case to a different judge. That disposition eliminated the need to resolve independently Ryann’s challenge to the exclusion of her witnesses.

Key Takeaways

  • A ruling that a motion does not qualify as an emergency is not a substantial ruling on the merits for purposes of substitution of judge as of right.
  • A preliminary hearing bars substitution only when it is a hearing on the merits of the underlying litigation.
  • Improper denial of a timely substitution motion requires vacatur of all orders entered after the motion was filed.

Why It Matters

The order reinforces the distinction between procedural case management and a substantive ruling that cuts off the statutory right to one substitution of judge. A court’s consideration of emergency status does not itself amount to adjudication of the requested relief, particularly when litigation over that relief continues through ordinary briefing.

The practical consequence is significant in family-law proceedings: an erroneous substitution ruling can invalidate the ensuing trial and final parenting orders. This Rule 23 order is nonprecedential except in the limited circumstances permitted by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e)(1).

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