Rivard v. Town of Brattleboro — affirmed dismissal of challenge to town trespass notices for lack of standing

Case
Jeffrey Rivard v. Town of Brattleboro et al.
Court
Vermont Supreme Court
Judge
Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice; Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice; Nancy J. Waples, Associate Justice
Date Decided
August 2026 (specific date not stated)
Docket No.
26-AP-173
Topics
Standing, Municipal Law, Due Process, Trespass Notices
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Jeffrey Rivard brought a Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 action against the Town of Brattleboro and its town manager, challenging the Town’s ongoing use of a “Trespass After Warning Affidavit.” He alleged that the notice violated due process by providing for an appeal by telephone and exceeded the Town’s authority by expanding criminal liability.

Rivard alleged that he had personally received warnings using the notice, attempted to invoke the stated appeal process, and received no response from the Town. He sought a declaration that the notice was unconstitutional, an injunction against its future use, and an order requiring the Town to adopt a new trespass-warning process. The superior court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing and denied reconsideration.

The Court’s Holding

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. Although Rivard alleged that he personally received warnings and unsuccessfully attempted to appeal, his complaint did not seek review of those particular warnings or the Town’s failure to respond in his case. Instead, he sought prospective relief against the Town’s general use of the notice as a member of the public.

The Court held that the requested remedy was untethered to any particularized injury arising from the notices Rivard received. Because alleged illegality alone does not establish standing, Rivard failed to plead the injury in fact required for the court to exercise jurisdiction.

Having concluded that Rivard lacked standing, the Court did not reach whether the notice exceeded the Town’s municipal authority or violated the Common Benefits Clause. It added that the Common Benefits argument was also unpreserved because Rivard had not raised it below with sufficient specificity and clarity.

Key Takeaways

  • A plaintiff seeking prospective relief against a municipal policy must connect the requested remedy to a particularized personal injury.
  • Personal exposure to a challenged notice does not establish standing when the complaint does not seek review or redress of the specific notices received.
  • A court will not reach the merits of constitutional or municipal-authority claims when the plaintiff lacks standing, and appellate arguments must also be preserved in the trial court.

Why It Matters

The decision underscores that Vermont standing doctrine requires more than an allegation that a government practice is unlawful. A plaintiff challenging an ongoing municipal process must plead an attributable, redressable injury and tailor the requested relief to that injury.

For practitioners bringing Rule 75 or declaratory-relief actions, the case highlights the importance of challenging the specific governmental action affecting the client rather than framing the complaint solely as a generalized objection to future government conduct.

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