Williams v. State — Court ordered reassignment after finding judge-change notice timely

Case
Jared Neil Williams v. State of Arizona
Court
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Judge
Samuel A. Thumma (Jan Brewer, 2012); Kent E. Cattani (Jan Brewer, 2013); Andrew M. Jacobs (Katie Hobbs, 2023)
Date Decided
August 27, 2026
Docket No.
1 CA-SA 26-0232
Topics
Criminal Procedure; Change of Judge; Special Action
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Jared Neil Williams was indicted in April 2024 on manslaughter, aggravated-assault, and driving-under-the-influence charges arising from a fatal car crash. The case was assigned to Judge Debra R. Phelan, and Williams did not seek a change of judge after his May 2024 arraignment.

In May 2026, a different grand jury returned another indictment based on the same crash, replacing the manslaughter charge with second-degree murder and altering the other felony charges. The new indictment was filed under the existing case number, and the case was again assigned to Judge Phelan at Williams’s May 6 arraignment. Williams filed his first notice of change of judge as a matter of right on May 18, within 10 judicial days of that arraignment. Judge Phelan denied the notice as untimely, reasoning that Rule 10.2’s filing period began at the first arraignment in the case.

The Court’s Holding

The Court of Appeals accepted special-action jurisdiction because denial of a peremptory change-of-judge notice cannot be challenged on direct appeal and the issue was one of statewide importance. It held that Williams’s notice was timely under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 10.2 and remanded the case for reassignment to a different judge.

The court concluded that, on the record presented, “the arraignment” in Rule 10.2(c)(1)(A) applied to Williams’s May 2026 arraignment. Williams had not previously exercised his one change of judge, had not participated in a contested matter before Judge Phelan, and filed a properly formed notice within the rule’s deadline. The court distinguished Woodington v. Browning because that case involved identical charges reissued after a court-ordered remand to the grand jury, while Williams’s second indictment added and materially increased charges without such a remand. It also observed that treating only the first arraignment as triggering the deadline could allow the State’s choice of where to file a new indictment to control whether a defendant could exercise the right.

Key Takeaways

  • A defendant’s first properly formed Rule 10.2 notice may be timely after arraignment on a later indictment filed in the same case when the later indictment materially changes the charges.
  • The ruling does not authorize successive peremptory challenges; Williams had filed only one notice of change of judge.
  • The court identified ambiguity in Rule 10.2(c)(1)(A)’s reference to “the arraignment” and suggested that a clarifying rule amendment would be beneficial.

Why It Matters

The decision prevents the prosecution’s filing choice alone from determining whether a defendant may exercise an unused change of judge as a matter of right after a materially different indictment. It also limits Woodington’s first-arraignment reasoning to its materially different procedural setting.

Until Rule 10.2 is clarified, Arizona courts evaluating later indictments must consider the nature of the new charges and the procedural circumstances rather than treating every second arraignment in an undismissed case identically.

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