Background
Gary Wayne Jent underwent an aortic-valve replacement and three-vessel coronary-artery bypass graft at Hazard ARH in March 2016. The lengthy surgery, performed by cardiothoracic surgeon Dr. James Shoptaw, was complicated by heavy bleeding. Jent was later transferred to the University of Kentucky Medical Center, where his condition deteriorated; life support was withdrawn, and he died on April 11, 2016.
Priscilla Jent sued Dr. Shoptaw, Hazard ARH Regional Medical Care Center, and Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. individually and as administratrix of Jent’s estate. The hospitals sought summary judgment on the ground that Curtis Brinkman—the perfusionist who operated the heart-lung machine and administered cardioplegia under Dr. Shoptaw’s direction—was not their employee or agent. The Perry Circuit Court ruled that the hospitals were not vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of Dr. Shoptaw or Brinkman and entered summary judgment for the hospitals. After a settlement preserved Jent’s right to appeal the claims against the hospitals, she challenged the ruling concerning Brinkman’s alleged ostensible agency.
The Court’s Holding
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. Applying Kentucky’s ostensible-agency doctrine and the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in Sneed v. University of Louisville Hospital, the court held that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Brinkman was an ostensible agent of the hospitals.
Before surgery, Jent and his wife signed a treatment-and-payment form stating that medical treatment would be provided by independent practitioners who were neither employees nor agents of Appalachian Regional Healthcare. Although the form and hospital signage did not specifically identify perfusionists, both used nonexclusive language, and the signage included “other medical specialists.” The court concluded that a perfusionist qualified as a medical specialist and found no evidence that the hospitals intended to deceive patients or held Brinkman out as an employee.
Key Takeaways
- A hospital may defeat an ostensible-agency claim at summary judgment when it clearly informs patients that practitioners providing care are independent and the record contains no evidence that it held the practitioner out as an employee.
- An independent-practitioner disclaimer need not expressly list every type of medical professional when its language makes clear that the listed examples are nonexclusive.
- The party asserting agency bears the burden of proving it, even though the summary-judgment record is viewed in that party’s favor.
Why It Matters
The decision applies Kentucky’s hospital ostensible-agency doctrine beyond physicians to a perfusionist involved in open-heart surgery. It confirms that broadly worded consent forms and signage may provide adequate notice of independent-contractor status even when they do not name the particular specialty at issue.
The opinion also illustrates the importance of evidence showing that a hospital represented a practitioner as its employee or intended to create that impression. Without such evidence, a signed disclaimer using clear, nonexclusive language can support judgment for the hospital as a matter of law.