Background
Kalub C. Douglas was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse under 720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(d), which requires proof that the defendant was “at least 5 years older” than the victim. The unusual factual wrinkle: Douglas and the 14-year-old victim, B.L.B., share the exact same birthday — May 30 — exactly five years apart. Douglas was born May 30, 2003; B.L.B. was born May 30, 2008.
On appeal, Douglas raised a novel argument: because there was no evidence of the precise time of day each person was born, the State failed to prove he was “at least 5 years older” than the victim. He argued that if, for example, the victim was born at 12:01 a.m. on May 30, 2008, and he was born at 11:59 p.m. on May 30, 2003, then at the time of the offense he was actually a fraction of a day less than five full years older.
The Court’s Holding
The Second District rejected this argument and affirmed the conviction. The court held that Illinois law does not recognize fractions of a day when computing a person’s age, relying on the established common-law rule from People v. Anderson, 108 Ill. App. 3d 563 (1982). Under this rule, a person attains a given age at the start of the anniversary of their birth date — the precise time of birth within the day is legally irrelevant.
Because Douglas and B.L.B. share the same birthday exactly five years apart, the court concluded that on the day B.L.B. was born (May 30, 2008), Douglas had attained the age of five years — meaning 1,827 full days had elapsed since his birth. Accordingly, he was “at least 5 years older” than B.L.B. as a matter of law, regardless of the specific hours of their respective births.
Key Takeaways
- Illinois courts do not recognize fractions of a day when computing age — a person attains a new age at the start (not end) of their birthday.
- When a statute requires a minimum age difference (such as “at least 5 years older”), sharing the same birthday exactly that number of years apart satisfies the element.
- The State need not prove the precise time of birth for either party to establish an age-difference element in a criminal case.
Why It Matters
While the factual scenario is unusual, this opinion resolves a potential ambiguity in Illinois’s age-computation methodology for criminal sexual abuse statutes. Defense attorneys have occasionally raised similar arguments in cases involving borderline age differences, and this decision forecloses the “time of birth” theory. The holding confirms that Illinois follows the common-law “anniversary rule” for computing age, providing certainty for prosecutors and courts in cases where the age difference is close to the statutory threshold.