Background
Freddy Hicks III sued the NCAA shortly before Tarleton State University’s 2025–2026 men’s basketball season began. On October 30, 2025, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order permitting Hicks to play basketball. The parties agreed to extend that order three times, ultimately through December 3, 2025.
After a December 3 hearing, the trial court issued a temporary injunction on December 8. The original order did not set a trial date as Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 requires. An amended order signed January 6, 2026, set trial for March 26, but the parties jointly obtained a stay of the trial pending the NCAA’s interlocutory appeal—even though Rule 683 states that an appeal from a temporary injunction is not grounds to delay trial.
The Court’s Holding
Chief Justice John M. Bailey concurred with his colleagues that, under Bienati v. Cloister Holdings, LLC, the parties’ postponement of the merits trial did not deprive the court of appellate jurisdiction to review the temporary injunction.
The supplied concurring opinion does not disclose the court’s disposition of the injunction or its ruling on the underlying eligibility dispute. Bailey wrote separately to emphasize that his agreement on jurisdiction did not endorse the parties’ disregard of Rule 683.
Key Takeaways
- Delaying a merits trial while a temporary-injunction appeal is pending did not eliminate the appellate court’s jurisdiction under the cited Texas Supreme Court precedent.
- Rule 683 requires a temporary-injunction order to set the case for trial and provides that an interlocutory appeal is not grounds to delay that trial.
- Bailey criticized the parties for seeking appellate resolution of substantial issues affecting student-athletes on the limited record developed during temporary-injunction proceedings.
Why It Matters
The concurrence highlights the tension between expedited injunctive relief in time-sensitive athletic-eligibility disputes and the need to adjudicate consequential legal questions on a fully developed record. It also warns litigants that appellate jurisdiction does not excuse noncompliance with procedural rules requiring prompt progression toward a merits trial.