Background
Sanjay Krishnan was convicted in 2020 of possessing not less than 2,375.1g of cannabis for the purpose of trafficking. The trial judge rejected his claim that he believed the box containing the drugs held collectors’ hunting knives and possibly contraband cigarettes. Although the judge found that he was a mere courier, he did not receive a certificate of substantive assistance and was therefore sentenced to the mandatory death penalty. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal and an application to adduce further evidence in January 2023.
After his execution was scheduled for 9 September 2026, Krishnan sought permission under s 60G of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 to apply for a stay. He relied on statements that Balachandran s/o Bernard made to the Central Narcotics Bureau in March 2026, claiming that he had instructed Krishnan and his co-accused to collect and deliver the box without telling them what it contained. Balachandran recanted those statements in May 2026. Krishnan argued that the March statements should be tested judicially and requested disclosure concerning their recording and delayed disclosure.
The Court’s Holding
A single judge sitting in the Court of Appeal summarily refused permission to bring the proposed post-appeal application. The court accepted that the March statements could not, with reasonable diligence, have been introduced before the appeal was concluded, that Krishnan had not delayed unreasonably after obtaining them, and that the applicable filing requirements had been satisfied. The application nevertheless failed because the proposed stay application had no reasonable prospect of success, as required by s 60G(7)(d).
The court found the March statements internally and externally inconsistent, incompatible with Krishnan’s and his co-accused’s earlier accounts, and contradicted by objective evidence, including phone records and the appearance of the package. Balachandran had also unequivocally admitted fabricating and recanted the statements, and the court rejected the suggestion that he recanted only after learning that he might face the death penalty. Because his evidence carried no evidential weight, there was nothing requiring further judicial testing, no basis to order the requested disclosure, and no real risk of an irreversible miscarriage of justice if a stay were denied.
Key Takeaways
- Permission for a post-appeal capital application requires the proposed application to have a reasonable prospect of success, even when the relied-upon material is genuinely new and promptly raised.
- Detailed or self-incriminating statements are not necessarily compelling fresh evidence when they conflict with prior accounts and objective evidence and have been recanted by an unreliable witness.
- The absence of abuse of process is neutral; it does not strengthen an otherwise unmeritorious application or establish exceptional grounds for a stay of execution.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the screening function of Singapore’s statutory regime for post-appeal applications in capital cases. Section 60G supplies a procedural gateway, but an applicant relying on fresh evidence must still show a substantive basis capable of giving the intended application a reasonable prospect of success.
It also demonstrates that the Court of Appeal may refuse permission without a hearing under s 60G(8) where the asserted fresh evidence is plainly unreliable and incapable of supporting a stay.