Background
Stark County Job and Family Services obtained emergency temporary custody of D.C. shortly after the child’s birth in September 2024. The juvenile court later adjudicated D.C. dependent and adopted a case plan addressing the mother’s mental health, marijuana use, parenting skills, housing, employment, and cooperation with the agency. The agency moved for permanent custody in August 2025.
The mother’s first appointed attorney withdrew because of her conduct, and the court appointed Attorney Arkow. On the day of the permanent-custody hearing, the court permitted Arkow to withdraw after he reported that the mother had taken his file, repeatedly accused him of conspiring with the agency and others, and refused to cooperate. The mother expressly requested another attorney and a continuance, but the court denied both requests. She then left the hearing despite being warned that it would proceed without her. The juvenile court ultimately granted permanent custody to the agency and terminated her parental rights.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth District affirmed, holding that the mother impliedly waived her right to counsel through her conduct even though she stated that she did not intend to waive it. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court emphasized her repeated failure to cooperate with multiple appointed attorneys, accusations against counsel and others involved in the case, communication breakdowns, and pattern of seeking replacement counsel. The trial court therefore did not err by declining to appoint a third attorney in this proceeding.
The appellate court also held that denying a continuance was not an abuse of discretion. The mother created the circumstances leading to counsel’s withdrawal, the requested delay was tied solely to obtaining another appointed attorney, and similar conduct had occurred in her earlier permanent-custody cases. The hearing had already been continued once, and the agency’s motion had been pending for more than seven months. The child’s need for safety, stability, and permanency outweighed another delay.
Key Takeaways
- A parent may impliedly waive the statutory right to counsel in a permanent-custody proceeding through persistent noncooperation with appointed attorneys, notwithstanding an express statement that the right is not waived.
- A court need not appoint successive replacement counsel when the parent’s own conduct repeatedly destroys the attorney-client relationship and appears calculated to delay the proceeding.
- When reviewing the denial of a continuance, courts may weigh the parent’s responsibility for the problem, prior delays, the legitimacy of the request, and the child’s need for permanency.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the limits of the important right to appointed counsel in parental-rights termination proceedings. Although Ohio treats termination as the family-law equivalent of the death penalty, a parent’s course of conduct can amount to an implied waiver when repeated obstruction makes representation unworkable.
The opinion also confirms that juvenile courts may prioritize a child’s need for timely permanency when a request for new counsel and further delay arises from the parent’s own repeated conduct.