Background
The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services became involved with CMB and his mother after police executing a September 2025 search warrant allegedly found methamphetamine within the child’s reach. The mother continued to test positive for methamphetamine, did not engage with offered substance-abuse treatment and other services, and lived in a home that a caseworker described as smoky and frequented by unknown people.
After the mother stopped cooperating with the agency and could not be located, DHHS sought emergency removal. The trial court removed CMB on February 6, 2026, and he was placed with his maternal grandmother. At the continued preliminary hearing, the mother stipulated to probable cause, and her attorney agreed that DHHS’s recommendations—including continued removal—were appropriate. The mother later appealed, arguing that counsel had improperly conceded removal and usurped her right to determine the objective of her defense.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It declined to decide whether the Sixth Amendment right of autonomy recognized in criminal cases extends to child-protective proceedings because the mother did not adequately develop that issue. The record also did not show that she had expressed an objective of opposing removal before counsel agreed with DHHS’s recommendation, so the court analyzed the claim under the traditional ineffective-assistance framework.
Counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable. At the initial hearing, counsel took no position because the mother was absent, and at the continued hearing the circumstances indicated that counsel and the mother had discussed CMB’s placement. The mother stipulated to probable cause, sought consideration of alternative placements, and did not object to continued removal at that time.
The mother also failed to establish prejudice. Evidence of her continued methamphetamine use, failure to identify a sober caregiver, unsafe home environment, lack of cooperation, and threatening statement about efforts to remove CMB supported the findings required for emergency removal under MCR 3.963(B). Given those findings and the mother’s probable-cause stipulation, an objection by counsel was unlikely to change the outcome.
Key Takeaways
- The court did not decide whether a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to control the objective of the defense applies in Michigan child-protective proceedings.
- Absent evidence that the mother expressly directed counsel to oppose removal, counsel’s agreement with continued removal was evaluated under the ordinary deficient-performance-and-prejudice test.
- The record supported emergency removal, making it improbable that an objection from counsel would have produced a different result.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that a parent asserting ineffective assistance in a child-protective case must identify both unreasonable representation and a reasonable probability of a different outcome. A later-expressed desire to regain custody does not, by itself, establish that counsel previously overrode an expressly stated litigation objective.
The opinion also confirms that MCR 3.963 governs an emergency removal pending continuation of a preliminary hearing and that documented substance use, an unsafe environment, refusal to cooperate, and threats concerning removal can collectively support the required risk-of-harm findings.